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Transfer of
Western Development Model
to Asia and its Impact

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PREFACE

As an institution committed to evolving concepts and approaches appropriate to Asian needs and situations, the Asian Centre for Development Administration has engaged in a number of research and management development programmes which would hopefully stimulate fresh thinking in the field of development policy and development management. To share these ideas and concepts with scholars and administrators concerned with these vital issues we propose to publish, from time to time, papers prepared by the Centre's staff or consultants on various development issues. The present paper entitled "Transfer of Western Development Model to Asia and its Impact" prepared by Dr. Inayatullah, Development Administration Expert with the Centre, is one such paper.

The basic thesis of the paper is that a lack of an adequate level of development in Asian countries is, to an extent, due to the fact that the Asian countries have too heavily relied on external sources in borrowing development models and shown too little creativity in evolving new models or appropriately relating the foreign models to suit local conditions. It is hoped that this paper would stimulate further debate aimed at a further understanding of the effects of the transfer of development models from one society to another.

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B. Mahadeva
Director
August 8, *1975*

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TRANSFER OF WESTERN DEVELOPMENT MODEL
TO ASIA AND ITS IMPACT *

Summary of Argument

Why have Asian societies in general not been able to evolve appropriate models of development? Why hasn't the transfer of the Western model of development produced the developmental results in Asian setting which it produced in

This paper is a sequel to two papers which debated the relevance of the Western model of development to the non-Western countries, one by Professor Danial Lerner and one by myself which were presented in a similar conference in 1964 and published in Danial Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, eds. Communication and Change in Developing Countries (Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1967).

In order to provide a background of this debate, a note summarizing the two points of views and critique of my own perspective is included as an appendix to this paper.

its original setting? The basic thesis of this paper is that in order to evolve an appropriate and authentic development model for a society or to adapt a foreign model to suit its local conditions, a sound intellectual apparatus in the form of a universally valid development theory, an appropriate set of attitudes toward learning from foreign models, and the political autonomy to choose suitable elements from diverse development models, are three necessary conditions. As these conditions have been absent in Asian societies since their domination by the West in a varying degree, the latter have not been able to develop appropriate development models or draw appropriate lessons from Western development experiences.

The Western development theory within whose frame-work the development and transfer of the Western model occurred is not an adequate intellectual framework for this purpose as it suffers from ethnocentrism, an exaggerated claim to universality, and from an overemphasis on the role of factors internal to Asian societies as causes of underdevelopment to the exclusion of external factors. [1]

1 To avoid a possible misunderstanding about the tone as well as the approach of this paper, it is necessary to enter certain caveats:

1). *The historical analysis of the relationship of West and non-Western societies is undertaken not to bemoan the past but to draw lessons for promoting a better future. Also it is not implied that a development model should be accepted or rejected purely because of its geographical or cultural source or even because it was historically imposed, but on. the basis of its demonstrated re and established relevance to the problems faced by a society.*

2). *By pointing out the defects of Western development theory and advocating the need for local intellectual creativity, I do not mean to say that each society or culture must create a separate development theory. To the contrary in fact, I believe, as Streeten has pointed out, that there can be national or local truth but not national or local criteria and procedures of knowing*

The necessary critical orientation and openness to influence from diverse development models was absent in model-importing Asian societies, and the necessary empathy for the peculiar problems and unique cultural characteristics of Asian societies was missing in the model transferring Western societies. Finally, the process of development and transference of the Western model occurred within the context of the domination of Asian society by the West.

These conditions contributed toward stifling the creativity in Asian societies to evolve appropriate and authentic models of development. Recently, however, these conditions have begun to change. The multipolarisation and diffusion of power in the international community, the end of Western domination, the •beginning of the emergence of a critical orientation among at least a small number of Asian scholars, openness to various development experiences, and the crisis in Western development theory have created the necessary conditions for the emergence of authentic and appropriate development models in Asian societies.

> *truth. Paul Streeten, "Some Problems in the Use and Transfer of an Intellectual Technology" in The Social Sciences and Development (Washington: The World Bank, 1974), p. 12. The greater the knowledge of diverse local realities the greater the probability of the emergence of a universal development theory, which could provide an intellectual basis for determining whether a development model developed in one society could be relevant to the needs of another.*

> 3). *Finally I do not assume that only local scholars can know the truth about a society, or that foreign scholars are inherently incapable of knowing another society. Rather what I want to stress is the fact that social scientists are products of a given culture and are intimately enmeshed in the power and social structure of their societies. This fact colours their perspective and outlook unless a conscious effort is made to eliminate it.*

The development of new models in Asian societies would occur in response to and within the context of three constraints: increasing scarcities, the tenacity of the traditional culture and social structure as well as institutionalized commitment to the imported development Western model, and the international setting of Asian societies. As constraints of international setting play a crucial role in determining the development of less developed societies, the chances of development of Asian societies would remain limited unless the international milieu is made conducive to their development. Thus the emergence of authentic development models and their effectiveness in Asian societies is closely linked to the evolution of a new global development model for mankind.

The paper is organized in the following way. First, a theoretical framework is proposed suggesting the conditions under which authentic and appropriate development model could be constructed in societies, which, when absent, turn this process into a unilateral imposition or imitation of models from one society to the *other.* Within *this* framework, an attempt is made to analyse the effects of the transfer of the Western model of development on Asian societies in two phases

of the East-West relations. By *Western* model, are implied two components: first, a cultural component which stresses secularisation of values, and social action, an analytical-empirical approach to understanding of nature, self, and society, and a quest and an urge for continuous improvement and perfection of technology; second, an institutional component, manifest in the form of a capitalist economy with a strong element of mercantilism, liberal democracy, the nation-state, and a rationalized structure of administration or bureaucracy. This is followed by an analysis of the prospects of the emergence of an authentic Asian model or models in the contemporary context of a multipolar power structure. At the end, the question is raised how the reconstruction of international, political and economic order is necessary for the emergence and implementation of authentic development models in Asian societies.

II

A Framework for Construction of Authentic Development Models

As human society becomes complex and man's determination as well as his capacity to manipulate his social environment increases, the question of evolving an appropriate design or model for the development of a society becomes more and more crucial. An error in understanding the laws of development of societies, if there are any, and a misconception with regard to the degree of autonomy of man from his environment could frustrate human efforts toward development. The selection of an appropriate model of development becomes all the more difficult as well as critical for those societies which on the basis of some criteria of development lag behind others and which are politically weak and economically vulnerable to external intervention and imposition. The structure of uneven development within which the "laggard" societies operate limits options of constructing appropriate models of development as it exerts a pressure on them toward imitation of the models of development of more developed society, thus stifling their inventiveness and creativity.

In constructing appropriate models for the development of a society, an elite assuming this task has to make several choices and take several actions. First, it has to choose a conception of development. It could either conceive it as a process of adjustment to existing reality or alternatively conceive it as a process of *becoming, choosing, modifying* and *self-steering.* On the basis of the conception it chooses, it must project the main contours of the image of a developed society, articulate the ultimate values in which development is to be rooted, and specify the intermediate goals it seeks. It must explicitly or implicitly relate this conception of development to a set of assumptions about how man and society operate, behave and change within the natural environment and continuously test these assumptions, or estimation of reality, against feedback from experience. On the basis of this knowledge it must assess the potentialities

in its internal and external environments to achieve development, as well as the constraints which the historical development of society, the contemporary international economic and power structure and the availability of resources impose on achieving development. Finally, it has to choose effective strategies of achieving intermediate goals and ultimate values and develop an institutional or instrumental complex which ensures the success of these strategies. In short, a development model has three elements, the value or cultural elements, the intellectual or cognitive elements, and institutional or strategy element which need to be mutually integrated to develop a consistent development model.

To the extent to which the elite constructs these models of development taking into account the larger societal goals, correctly estimating the potentialities as well as the situational constraints imposed by reality, appropriately learning from the experiences of other societies as well as accurately monitoring their own experiences, it can construct authentic models of development. The authenticity and relevance of these models to the problems of their societies play a critical role in determining whether development really occurs as expected and planned or not.

This process of constructing a model for the development is influenced by several factors which facilitate or distort its relevance and authenticity, most crucial of them are the following three:

1) The extent of political independence and responsiveness of the elite to the larger interests of the society;

2) The presence or absence of an adequate intellectual apparatus to know reality, to learn from the development experiences of other societies as well as monitoring the experience of one's own society;

3) Attitudes toward learning from development experiences of other societies as well as one's own experiences.

Subordination of the elite of a society to those of another society leads to the imposition of development models of the dominant society on the dominated society regardless of their relevance to the condition of the latter. This imposition facilitates the perpetuation of domination-subordination, an imposed model serving as a means of legitimising it. As a consequence of subordination, the dominated society has usually to accept the wholesale transfer of the development model from the dominant society without an opportunity for selective adaptation unless this itself is considered to be in the interest of the dominant society. When an elite is not independent from external control or is not responsive to the larger interest of its society, it is unlikely to derive developmental goals from authentic and general values of the society which

come to be substituted with either values and interests of the dominant power or its own narrower and parochial interests.

Under ideal conditions, the learning from the experiences of other societies for constructing development models goes through a process of interpretation, inference, and experimentation; the experiences of other societies (the model societies) are first interpreted to determine their meaning, then appropriate inferences are drawn for evolving goals and adequate strategies of development for learning societies. The models of development thus evolved are subjected to experimentation and modified on the basis of feedback from the local experience. The process of interpretation, inference and experimentation thus completed, generates a new set of generalisations about the process of development incorporating the experiences of both societies, the learning society and the model society. With the emergence of this systematised and generalised knowledge, a society comes to acquire the necessary intellectual apparatus for accelerating its process of development [2] In the absence of such an intellectual apparatus, the society concerned may not acquire true knowledge of its constraints and potentialities, or may not draw correct inferences from the experiences of other societies, thus becoming a victim of endless trials and errors.

Learning by the elite of a learning society from the development experiences of model societies occurs within a given set of attitudes. Three types of attitudes play a crucial role. The first set of attitudes relates to whether the elite of the learning society has reached a high degree of self-closure reflected in chauvinism and xenophobia or whether it is well- disposed toward the intake of outside knowledge and experience. A second set of attitudes pertains to the mode of borrowing from model societies by the elite of the learning society; whether it is impelled by a tendency to imitate or alternatively is based on a critical evaluation of the model society. A third set of attitudes relates to whether the elite of the model society is aggressively messianic towards imposing its "truths" on the learning societies or it is empathetic to the "rationality" behind the cultural and social peculiarities of the learning society. A high degree of messianic orientation in the elite of the model society may be unconducive for selective adaptation by the elite of the learning society. The mutual learning can occur best when societies are not xenophobic and chauvinistic, are not highly motivated to impose their exclusive truth on others, and do not adopt development models merely on the basis of imitation.

2 About the role of a sound intellectual apparatus and a development theory in the process of development, see JJ. Spengler, "ideology, Theory and Values" in J.J. Spengler and Ralph Braibanti, eds. Traditions, Values and Development (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961), PP. 1—56.

In short, the following three conditions are necessary for evolving authentic models of development by the elite of a society:

1). The learning from model societies occurs without learning societies being under the domination of the former, and with the goal of promoting development of the learning societies.

2). The existence of a body of knowledge, a theory about the development of societies incorporating the experiences of learning as well as model societies which can be used to interpret and absorb each other's experiences and determine their relevance for meeting the developmental needs of a society. To be effective, this theory has to be acquired by an intellectual elite and used for designing development plans.

3). The presence of strong disposition to learn from other societies (or the absence of xenophobia and chauvinism) and a critical rather than imitative orientation to the values of other cultures in the elite of the learning society.

Rarely, however, does the construction of development models occur in these ideal conditions. Frequently one or two and occasionally all three conditions are missing. Frequently the transfer of models from one society to another occurs through the domination of one by the other. A body of knowledge developed in one society comes to be substituted for validated knowledge about both. The absence of an awareness of the special characteristics of the dominant society and lack of empathy for what is unique in the dominated society leads to the imposition of irrelevant elements on the latter by the former.

In the absence of the above mentioned three conditions, the capacity of the elite of a society to develop authentic models of development is seriously weakened for the following reasons. First, the elite loses the capacity to correctly monitor its internal and external environment and develops a distorted self-image as well as images of other societies from information received from controlled channels. Secondly, this lack of true information about its environment, as well as the interest of the dominant society in ensuring the effective transfer of the imposed model leads to a decline iii its learning capacity and creativity as the elite of the dominated society has neither the adequate information nor the capacity and freedom to choose, experiment, modify and reject the imposed model, either in part or in toto. Thirdly, it loses intellectual coherence, self-steering capacity and an authentic sense of values. It reacts to the externally imposed model as well as its own model of development irrationally, possibly accepting what is irrelevant from the imposed model, rejecting what possibly could be useful in it, and neurotically clinging to its own model of development.

III

Transfer of Western Model of Development
under Colonial Phase

Since the domination of Asian countries by the West the process of cultural exchange between the West and Asia has passed through three phases:

a). The first phase lasted up to the end of the colonial period.

b). The second phase began with the end of the Second World War and ends with the beginning of Seventies.

c). The third phase began with the recent occurrence of significant changes in the international power structure.

In contemporary history, the first stage of cultural contact between the West and the Asian societies began in the Seventeenth Century. The Western countries, by effectively using new technology, changed the balance of economic and military power vis-a-vis the non-Western world (which existed before the industrial revolution), and expanded into the non- Western world. This colonial expansion provided the first extensive contact of the West with the non-Western societies and generated among colonial officials and subsequently scholars an interest in understanding culture and social organisation of these societies. This also stimulated an interest in the comparative analysis of societies and .the inevitable question of why the West achieved a developmental break-through which non-Western societies failed to achieve — a topic which has produced great scholarly works by Max Weber and others. However, as this intellectual desire of Westerners to understand the non-Western societies followed the objective fact of economic and political domination by the West of the non-Western world, they could not maintain their scholarly disinterestedness and objectivity.

The theory of comparative development of societies (to be summarily referred as Western development theory) which emerged in the West suffered from three basic imperfections, which may be called the flaws of

1) "ethnocentric gradation";

2) "exaggerated universality"; and

3) "exclusive internal causation".

1. It classified all societies dichotomously or occasionally trichotomously (primitive, medieval, modern) on a unilinear basis using socio-cultural achievements of the West as a measure of development, progress, or modernity. It presumed an incompatibility between tradition and modernity

implying the total West-like transformation of a society to be a prerequisite for earning the status of a developed society. It ignored the possibility of multilinear socio-cultural evolution which would have undermined the basis for such a classification. Further, all non-Western societies were usually lumped together without making further internal differences and distinctions.

2.   It interpreted the history of man and particularly the history of non-Western societies in the light of its own experiences, elevating a development theory based on European experiences to a universally valid theory for all societies.

3.   The causes of underdevelopment or development were sought in the internal characteristics of the developed and underdeveloped societies ignoring the effects of the nature of the relationship between them.

These three flaws are manifest in two most influential theories of development emerging from the West, the theories which have shaped the basic premises of most later theories of development and modernization, the evolutionary theory and classical economics. The application of the evolutionary theory to societies generated powerful insights but it also introduced the three basic flaws to the development theory. Under the impact of this theory a dichotomous conceptualisation of less "evolved" and more "evolved" societies emerged, implying a universal trend toward evolution of the more evolved from the less evolved. Comet's; Spencer's, Main's, Tonnies' and Durkhiem's classifications of societies, as moving from theological, metaphysical to positive, from militant to industrial, from status to contract, from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity became the standard mode of analysing comparative development.[3] It posited the Western path to modernity as the single inevitable route.[4] Finally, theories developed under its influence in

3.   See Robert A. Nisbet, Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

4.   Commenting on comparative analysis developed under the influence of evolutionary theory, Nisbet writes: ". . . The Comparative Method, as we find in the writings of the nineteenth century social evolutionists, and to a considerable degree at the present time, is hardly more than a shoring up of the idea of progressive development generally and, more particularly, of the belief that the recent history of the West could be taken as evidence of the direction in which mankind as a whole would move and, flowing from this should move. The specific set of cultural qualities that seemed to most rationalist in the nineteenth century to manifest the direction of Western history were adopted for comparative purpose to become the criteria of classification of the peoples and cultures of the world." Robert Nisbet, Social Change and History; Aspects of the Western Theory of Development op. cit., pp. 190-19 1. See also Dean C. Tipps, "Modernisation Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History 15 (March, 1973):199-226.

variably sought causes of underdevelopment in internal conditions of the developed or less developed societies.

The superior achievements of the West were attributed to its Greco-Roman heritage, the peculiar structure of its feudalism, and Protestant

ethics. The lack of development of non-Western societies was attributed to oriental despotism, non-rational religious orientations, and inegalitarian social structures. The effects of economic, political and cultural domination of the non-Western world by the West were rarely analysed though evolutionary theory or its sociological counterpart, Social Darwinism, would have resolved this intellectual dilemma by equating domination with cultural superiority. [5]

The emergence of classical economic theory reinforced two of the three flaws; the flaws of exaggerated universality, and exclusive internal causation. This theory built laws about the economic behaviour of man on the assumption of an economic man, presumably living outside the influence of diverse cultures and social organisations and posited that the self-interest seeking drives of economic man were the mainspring of all development and growth, which traditional culture and society tended to suppress. Further, it assumed a basic harmony between the interests of the individual and the collectivity, ensured through the intervention of an invisible hand. Furthermore, within the inter-societal setting, the law of comparative advantage governed the specialisation and development

5.   *It is interesting that obvious implications of biological evolutionary theory, namely that external environments played a determinant role in shaping the internal characteristics of organisms were not carried into the development theory of societies. This would have brought out the effects of domination and subordination on societies as an important factor in their development or lack of development. The lack of interest in this implication shown by great scholars is difficult to explain except by attributing it to their ethnocentrism.*

of societies, a specialisation which was presumably to the benefit of all societies rather than to the disadvantage of any. If a society failed to benefit from this international specialisation to maximise its potentialities, this was due to factors specific and internal to such a society. These assumptions diverted attention away from mutually antagonistic or incompatible interests between societies which could retard their development.

The development theory existing in non-Western societies was also inadequate to interpret the facts of Western domination and cultural achievements due basically to its three inherent characteristics. First, it was essentially an "idealistic" theory in the sense that it attributed major changes in society to changes in beliefs and ideas and ignored or de-emphasized the role of material forces in shaping and changing a society. Secondly, it was highly ethnocentric, much more so than the new Western theory emerging under the influence of evolutionary theory. It placed its own society, its culture, at the center of the cultural universe and measured, explained, and interpreted itself in relationship to others within this framework. Finally, in contrast with Western unilinear development theory, it was cyclical. When the shattering effects of Western domination precipitated, this theory could not interpret the change coherently. It could not reconcile its dominant ethnocentric orientation with the new facts of pre-eminence in technology, social organisation and other cultural traits of the Western "infidels" and "barbarians" without radically restructuring

itself. This restructuring did not take place. The Asians were intellectually ill-equipped to face the new situation.

In view of the failure of a universally valid theory to emerge and as a result of basic flaws in both the modern development theory of the West and traditional non-Western theories, there was no coherent intellectual framework within which the relevance of Western development experiences for non-Western societies could be determined. Consequently what was transferred from the West was primarily dictated by the imperatives of domination or unanticipated consequences of it.

To maintain control over large number of colonial people at reasonable administrative cost, bureaucratic organisations were established whose middle and lower echelon were manned by local people. To appropriate economic surplus, local economic self-sufficiency was broken and colonial economies were drawn into a dependency relationship with metropolitan economy. The capitalistic mode of production replaced the traditional communal and other patterns of production. To perform these political, administrative and economic functions effectively and at a sufficiently low cost, a new class of cultural brokers emerged and became the carrier of various elements of the cultural component of the Western model, the secularism, rational orientation to social action, and quest for improved technology to control nature, etc. However, from this class emanated also the demand for Western style of political liberal democratic institutions as well as eventually the demand for the creation of sovereign nation-state.

The attitudinal framework in which the contacts between the West and non-Western societies took place and the Western model of development was exported, were not conducive for a true appreciation of what could be learned from the West. The Western societies had an aggressive messianic orientation which conflicted with a similar orientation in some of the non-Western, especially the Islamic societies which enjoyed a pre-eminent international status before the rise of the West. Initially, there was also a high degree of chauvinism and xenophobia in the non-Western societies which, as domination of the West proceeded successfully, was later replaced by an imitative orientation to Western culture.

Among the Western societies, two distinct categories of orientation existed towards the transformation of non-Western societies; these were represented by colonial administrators and businessmen, and the Christian missionaries. In the first category the orientation was pragmatic as well as missionary. The basic interest was to control, rule and extract resources and profit, and only secondarily to "civilise" the barbarians. Wherever the two interests conflicted, the pragmatic interest usually prevailed. To the extent that transfer of Western culture was necessary for effective control, it was

encouraged. Where calculus of control required preservation of local customs, tradition, and administrative structure, they were not disturbed.

In the second category were the Christian missionaries, who had a distinctly aggressive messianic orientation. Their efforts were not only directed towards a clean sweep of what were regarded as pagan beliefs, customs and a tradition regarded as incompatible with the theological dictates of Christianity, but also towards indoctrination of the local people in the superiority of the Western civilization. There was a convergence of interest, to a great extent, between the pragmatic interests of the colonial rulers and the missionaries. The Christianization of non-Western society could lessen the alienation between the Christian rulers and their non-Christian subjects, thus solidifying colonial rule as well as making it less costly.

As Western culture and institutions were transmitted through the medium of colonialism, within a framework which supported the unidirectional transfer of Western values, non-Western societies could develop neither a true appreciation of the achievements of the West nor a rational and discriminative attitude towards it. Their response ranged from complete surrender to the overawing Western cultural and technical superiority to complete rejection of everything Western, with several shades in between.

The reaction took the shape of an exaggerated sense of inferiority, despising everything local, admiring everything Western, adopting Western ways in toto. The other reaction was the denigration of Western cultural achievements labelling them purely materialistic, essentially immoral; compensation of current inferiority was' sought by the resurrection of ancient superiority; the past was glorified, present devalued.

These reactions internally split the non-Western societies. There was intellectual chaos and confusion. There was loss of identity and memory as well as anger and frustration. With this frame of mind intellectual creativity could not be nurtured, fostered or developed; authentic and integrated models of development could not be evolved. A true appreciation of the society's problems could not develop. Material deprivation, intellectual sterility and social stagnation became the fate of the non-Western societies.

The only country in Asia which truly escaped the full impact of domination by the West was Japan. Though Japanese society swung back and forth in contrasting moods of xenophobia and readiness to imitate and these fluctuations introduced abberations in the mode of learning, still in the absence of colonialism Japan was much freer to choose and learn from Western development experience which enabled it to quickly master its technology, successfully adapt it to its social structure, and achieve a considerable level of development by the end of the 19th century. [6]

6 *A Japanese scholar writing about the impact of the Western model on Japan writes: "The third point is that the Japanese try to maintain their independence in their adoption of a foreign civilization, as can be seen in the words: "Japanese spirit and Chinese knowledge". The Japanese more or less succeeded in adopting foreign cultures while retaining their own independence. Such self-confidence was partly encouraged by the fortunate fact that Japan had never been conquered by a foreign country and by the geographical factor that Japan was situated on the island of the Far East." Masaaki Kosaka, "Rebirth of Japan and the Impact of the West" in The New Asia(New York: Mentor Book, 1965), p. 383.*

To sum up, in the first phase of cultural contact between the Western and the non-Western world, particularly Asian societies, all three conditions necessary for creative and selective learning from development of the West were more or less absent. The true learning never occurred. The Western development models were unilaterally transferred and imposed.

IV

Transfer of Western Model of Development in The Second Phase of Western Domination

The second phase of cultural contacts between the West and the non-Western world began after the Second World War in the late forties and early fifties. Direct domination by the West of the non-Western world ended. Declining military and economic power of the war-weary European countries and widespread struggles for national liberation led to decolonisation of the non-Western world. The Soviet Union emerged as a superpower possessing nuclear technology. The Communists in China took over the mainland. This shook the foundation of the international power structure in which Western nations were so preeminently hegemonous.

The United States, which emerged from the Second World War unscathed and which now possessed technological superiority through the development of nuclear power and economic prosperity, however, attempted to rescue this power structure from complete breakdown by seeking, under its leadership, a new economic, cultural and military partnership between the West and the non-Western world. By its very nature this partnership was unequal and devoid of ideological and economic foundations. An effort was made to provide it with an ideological underpinning by evolving the concept of a "free world" in which the non-Western world was included. Military pacts were forged ostensibly to save the non-Western world from communism and for democracy. Vast programmes of technical assistance were developed to modernise the non-Western world and to enhance the capacity of "liaison elite" to effectively govern their societies as well as to ensure economic affluence which was considered a panacea for communism.

This phase of Western domination was differentiated from the first phase by a certain degree of reluctance on the part of the West to impose its ways on the non-Western societies in old colonial style. [7] There was increased

appreciation of the cultures and ways of the non-Western world whose preservation was presumably necessary for the sake of cultural pluralism and diversity. There was also great desire to understand the mysteries of the Orient, though occasionally this quest was stimulated less by the need for cultural appreciation and more by the need for developing an effective strategy of its transformation. There was a change in style. The Western technical experts during this phase stressed the need for adaptation rather than adoption of the Western model. There was a sense of unease with the undirectional transfer of the Western model as reflected in technical assistance programmes being labelled as "cultural exchange" programmes.

The transfer of the Western development model to non- Western societies occurred within the context of three goals which the Western countries sought to achieve in their relationship with the non-Western world:

a).   the goal of military protection for political allies during both cold or hot wars;

b).   the goal of political stability for non-Western countries to safeguard them from perceived internal political subversion; and

c).   the goal of modernizing these countries.

Underlying these goals, of course, was the perception of the security needs of Western countries, the expansion of international political influence, and the protection and promotion of national economic interests. As the three goals and the underlying interests behind them were not always mutually

[7]   *Occasionally this reluctance is based on the notion that primitive people, in any case, are incapable of operating Western institutions of democracy, free enterprise and the nation-state.*

compatible, the goal of modernization being at the lower end of the goal hierachy, zeal for the transfer of the Western model was tempered and constrained by these strains. **8** If promotion of liberal democracy in a country led to opting a country out of the Western alliance, weakening political groups sympathetic to this alliance, or fostering political instability which could create the risk of ideological subversion, the zeal for model transference was tempered. But where there emerged a possibility of choosing development strategies having little or no negative effects on other goals, financial and technical assistance frequently became a lever for promoting Western model of development [9]. This explains the condonement or occasional encouragement of an authoritarian regime in preference to democratic regimes, support of the public sector in preference to the private sector, and support of ethnic demands for autonomy vis-a-vis consolidation of power of national governments as not really an abandonment of the concept of transfer of the Western model but its judicial and pragmatic application.

The attitudes of the political elite in Asia toward the Western development model developed w mm a context of cold war, competition among superpowers to win the political loyalties of the political elite in Asia, and deployment of technical assistance programmes for this purpose. Temptations of

[8] John D. Montgomery, Foreign Aid International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.Y. Prentice—Hall), p. 67.

[9] Professor Montgomery seemed to have implied that no particular model guided the operation of American foreign aid and assistance programmes. However, the criteria which Montgomery employs to evaluate the effects of American foreign aid include not only the achievement of abovementioned goals but also achieving modernization of underdeveloped countries on the pattern of the West. See also Alan Richard Kasdan, The Third World: A New Focus for Development (Cambridge, Mass, Shenkman Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 49-50.

getting monetary, technical, and in some cases, military assistance, proved too alluring for Asian elites, hard pressed by a scarcity of resources for developing their societies, to resist it despite the inclusion of ideological baggage which came with it [10] On the other hand, political independence created demand for greater autonomy of action, and identification with the history, tradition and culture of the country. Also, certain degree of stigma came to be attached to being tied to the apron strings of an international political camp, while a neutral international posture won a certain degree of prestige and esteem.

These contrary pressures created an ambivalence towards both Western aid and the Western development model which was resolved differently by the elites of different countries. The resolution usually took three forms. First, a total aggressive and a resentful rejection of Western aid and model in favour of an indigenous model or another foreign model. This attitude, however, was not conducive to a true evaluation of the Western model to determine what elements of it could be useful and relevant, to integrate into an authentic indigenous model of development. Second, a partial resolution of this ambivalence was reflected in an erratic attitude towards the Western model. When crises and emergencies left no option but to solicit Western help, the Western model and aid would be accepted. When international and local pressures permitted, the need for an alternative and indigenous model would be asserted. The partial resolution also reflected occasionally in acceptance of some

[10] an analysis of the attitudinal framework which surrounded the export of technical assistance, see Denis Goulet, The Cruel Choice, (New York, Atheneum, 1971), Ch. 8.

[11] This attitude is symbolised by the Soekarno regime in Indonesia especially since early sixties.

elements of the Western model, liberal democracy, for instance, and rejection of other elements such as free enterprise. [12] The third form of resolution emerged in the shape of total acceptance of Western aid and its development model with only peripheral modifications to suit the political needs of the elite with considerable dc-emphasis of local autonomy and creativity. [13] None of these responses, however, had the basic elements for promoting conditions fevourable

for the development of an appropriate development model based on creative learning from both local and foreign experiences.

The intellectual elite, like the political elite in non- Western societies, inherited an ambivalent attitude towards the West. During the colonial period, most of them resented and rejected Western political domination, and supported the liberation movements to overthrow it. They were also conscious of the fact that the intellectual culture in which they were immersed emanated from the West and perceived this immersion as alien to the culture and masses of their country [14] On the other hand they were the product of this Western intellectual culture whose quality and depth they admired. One way to resolve this ambivalence and inconsistency was to accept from the West a radical version of Western intellectual orientation — Marxism — which not only had a strong intellectual foundation but re-inforced their anti-imperialist posture. The appeal of Marxism further increased as the Soviet Union, under its influence, transformed its economy and society in a relatively short period.

[12] *This attitude emerged in almost all Asian countries at some stage of their historical development but India particularly reflects this partial resolution during its last three decades of development.*

[13] *Most of the Asian countries with defence and "ideological" alignment with United States adopted this posture.*

[14] *Edward Shils, The Intellectuals Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation, (Hague: Mouton and Co. 1961).*

For intellectuals less deeply immersed in Western intellectual culture, and more footed in traditional culture, the ushering in of independence strengthened their identification with local tradition and culture and fortified their anti-Western intellectual posture resulting in a strong commitment to revivalism. Thus, the intellectual community of Asian countries was rift apart by strong intellectual divisions.

The rivalries of cold war and greater penetration of superpowers into the non-Western periphery put these intellectual postures under considerable strain. First, the foreign technical assistance programmes offered young intellectuals opportunities for travel and study abroad, opportunities for improving professional qualifications and skills which were in demand in their own countries and which could bring rapid advances in career as well as material comforts and rewards. Besides, the usually conservative Asian regimes could use the intellectual skills imparted to young intellectuals by the West but not the radical intellectual ideologies, whether Marxist or revivalist. Consequently, from both these sources pressure developed to sedate the radical intellectual posture. Most intellectuals generally adjusted to these pressures by developing either the value-neutral posture of a *mandarin,* serving the powerful or an attitude of overt compliance combined with covert rejection. Neither of the two attitudes were conducive for developing the intellectual posture necessary for creative participation in and guidance of the development process of their countries, or for

the critical objective evaluation of the Western development model or other models.

In this second phase of Western domination, Western development theory developed still further. Its empirical richness increased as a result of the publication of a large number of outstanding works combining interdisciplinary insights and approaches in both the ideographic and nomothetic traditions, on the functioning of non-Western societies. An awareness of the ethnocentric bias of the Western theory increased. Caution against the excessive claims and exaggerated universality of this theory was sounded [15] by the monumental work, *Asian Drama.* There was limited though growing dissatisfaction with the flaw of ethnocentric grading. There was demand for cultural relativistic as well as multilinear theories of development. However, inspite of this, the basic and dominant orientations of the Western development theory remained unchanged as evidenced in the writings of even those scholars who had become aware of the role of ethnocentrism and political constraints in conditioning theoretical and intellectual perspectives. First, the basic assumption of the traditional theory about exclusive internal causation of underdevelopment and the assumption of a benevolent international environment remained basically unchanged. [16] Secondly, in comparisons of Western and non-Western historical development, Western scholars continued to see virtue in everything Western while downgrading similar phenomena in non-Western societies. [17] A third weakness of the traditional development theory of universalizing

[15] *"Economic theorists, more than other social scientists, have long been disposed to arrive at general propositions and then postulate them as valid for every time, place and culture. There is a tendency in contemporary economic theoiy to follow this path to the extreme."* Gunnar Mysdal Asian Drama New York: Pantheon, 1968), P. 16.

[16] *This is evident in the writings of Gunnar Mysdal who resurrected the old ghost of "attitudes and institutions" of underdeveloped countries as being the most crucial factor in their underdevelopment, In the model he built for explaining underdevelopment he adopted a closed system of six interdependent elements of output and incomes, conditions of production, level of living, attitude toward life and work, and institutions and policies. This system does not include a structure of international trade, terms of trade, and political dependency of the poor countries on the rich countries as factors in underdevelopment (Asian Drama, pp. 1859 — 1878).*

[17] *Myrdal, comparing Western and Asian nationalism notes: "What could in Europe unfold gradually and proceed as a grand symphony with one movement following the other in thematic consequence is by destiny*

European experiences and interpreting the rest of the world in their light also persisted. [18]

syncopated in South Asia into almost a cocophony". (Asian Drama pp. 119-120). This statement of comparison is obviously not true. The rise of nationalism in Europe cannot be considered to be a grand symphony as it led to several bloody wars including two major world wars, the breakdown of heterogenous empires into small states based on language, religion and ethnicity, the suppression of minorities in Nazi Germany, the continous struggle of certain ethnic groups to seek autonomy from the newly emergent nation-state. Even in contemporary Europe aspiring to create a single European community, the negative role of particularistic factors both in building the new community and subverting the nation-state is considerable.

Basque and Catalonian in Spain, Scots and Welsh in the United Kingdom, and Walloon and French in Belgium are hard put to accommodate their ethnic aspirations within a single nation-state. Neither can Asian nationalism be considered so disharmonious if the nation building experiences of two countries in Asia, each of equal size to Europe, China and India, are compared with Europe. For a further example of this type of bias in Asian Drama, see Kusum Nair "Asian Drama — A Critique", Economic Development and Culture change 17 (July 1969): 449-459.

[18] *Consider the following example from Huntington who after discovering the narrow confines of the development theory seems to have abandoned the concept of modernisation. Analysing the effects of transnational organisations on world politics, nation-state and underdeveloped countries he writes: "In economic history, the impetus for change came from neither feudal lord nor feudal peasant but rather from a new urban class of merchants and entrepreneurs who developed alongside but outside the feudal social structure and as Marx recognised, this was the revolutionary class. Similarly, today the revolutionary organisations in world politics are not the national or international organisations which have been part of the nation-state system, but rather the transnational organisations which have developed alongside but outside that system. Just as the bourgeoisie represented*

These weaknesses of traditional development theory were aggravated as development theory, alternatively known as "modernization theory" came under the influence of Western foreign policy interests which were to save the non-Western societies from subversive ideologies and modernise them through technical assistance programmes. [19] This is evident from the

a principle of organisation foreign to the feudal system, so do the transnational organisations represent a principle of organisation foreign to the nation-state system". (Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organisations in World Politics", World politics 25 (April 1973): 368. Obviously by economic history he means European economic history and not the economic history of the world including the history of the non-Western world, as the statement could be true only for Europe. Secondly, as in the economic history of Asia, the bourgeoisie has not performed the progressive role which the European bourgeoisie has presumably played in the economic history of Europe, the analogy that transnational organisations would play the same role as European bourgeoisie does not strike the right chord in Asian minds. The transnational experiences of Asian countries have not always been reminiscent of progress and development, freedom and autonomy, but rather of exploitation and control. Obviously with this type of historical experience, Asians cannot be inclined to accept a positive role of transnational organisation. The argument should rest on the positive achievements of transnational organisations in the context of the welfare of the people of the Asian countries or in the ultimate interest of mankind rather than on analogy with European bourgeoisie. For more illustrations, see Hussain Alatas "Captive Mind in Development Studies", International Social Science Journal 24 (1972); 14 ff.

[19] *The social scientists are becoming increasingly aware of this contamination. Myrdal says, "The most perceptible political influence on the research approach in Western countries is the predominant role given to the considerations of national power and international power relations. In a world full of perils of national security and survival, this tendency is understandable; it is often asserted to be a more realistic direction of social research. The implication is, however, that studies of the problems of underdeveloped countries are now*

type of questions this theory chose to raise and investigate or did not raise and investigate. 20 concentrated on sharply identifying the contours of the Western path to modernity, and set up Western institutions and values as an exclusive model of development. It focused on how the cultural heritage of non-Western societies was blocking their path to modernity and how the "transfer of institutions" from the West could rescue them from their present condition. It sought an explanation

[20] *For a more extensive critique of the modernization theory, see Mark Kesselman "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development as Ideology", World Politics 26 (October 1973): 139-154; Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective", Comparative Studies in Society and History 15 (March 1973): 199-226; Paul Streeton, "Some Problems in the Use and Transfer of an Intellectual Technology" (World Bank 1973): 3-54; A.W. Singham and N.L. Singham, "Cultural Domination and Political Subordination: Notes Towards a Theory of the Carribean Political System", Comparative Studies in Society and History 15 (June 1973): 258-288; and Terence K. Hopkins, "Third World Mobilization in Transnational Perspective", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 386 (November 1969) : 126—136, and several essays in Hans-Dieter Evers, ed., Modernisation in South-East Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), particularly by W.F. Werthiem, "Resistance to Change — From Whom", and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics", Comparative Politics 3 (April 1971): 290 - 296.*

of underdevelopment in the psychic domain, the lack of "need achievement", "amoral familism", lack of "psychic empathy", "traditionalism", and the presence of the concept of "Limited Good", factors which were closely related to the traditional culture of the less developed countries or in terms of traditional social structure such as social inequalities reflected in the caste system. (These factors, indeed, are related to the backwardness of these societies but they do not fully explain the reasons for backwardness). Modernization theory did not enquire into the effects of the structure of international power, patterns of international trade and distribution of international resources as factors promoting or blocking the development of societies. [21] It ignored the impact of technical assistance policies on the definition of the role of development, determination of priorities, and on sustaining and strengthening the existing power structure. It presumed rationality on the part of donors of aid and non-rationality on the part of its recipients, ignoring the effects of domestic political pressures, interagency conflicts, disagreement among individuals of the donor countries on the definition of the technical assistance programmes. [22]

The modernizing role of military and civil bureaucracies which had developed earlier contacts with the West and uncritically absorbed its culture was eulogised and exaggerated and their repressive and antidevelopment role de-emphasized. This provided a much needed legitimation to military and bureaucratic regimes in Asia allied to the West. It produced knowledge specifically to help the liaison elite in developing countries 28 to face challenges to its shaky power. It suggested strategies of reforms oriented to gradual, incremental, and peripheral changes in developing countries. It did not enquire what types of action or what type of model would raise the autonomy of

21 Hopkins, op.cit., p. 132, Tipps, p. 212.

22 David E. Apter and S.S. Mushi, "Disciplinary Contributions: Political Science", International Social Science Journal 24(1972): 46.

action of developing countries, what type of political and economic system would free them from grinding poverty, social injustice, social stagnation and ensure their continued development. The question posed invariably was in what ways could the Western model be effectively transferred. In what ways the operation of free enterprise and liberal democracy could be ensured in developing countries regardless of their cost and consequences to the society concerned. The elements of order and stability in political development were overstressed and the rising of demands and radical movements, was considered a political threat producing political decay.

While Western development theory suffered from the abovementioned imperfections, traditional development theory in Asia, due to its inherent flaws of an idealistic and cyclical orientation and ethnocentrism, could not further grow and develop especially in the presence of intellectually overpowering Western theory. Consequently it failed to provide these countries with a cognitive map for determining the directions of development. However, as problems of national development and national integration could not be understood and comprehended without an intellectual framework, the Western development theory or Marxist development theory were employed to fill the vacuum created by the absence of a universal development theory as applicable to local societies.

The transplantation and diffusion of Western development theory to Asian societies occurred during the colonial period and was further re-inforced by two mechanisms. First, the Asian bureaucrats, students, teachers and other intellectuals were trained in Western universities on an increasingly large scale where they were fully exposed to the Western development theory. Indeed, the Western universities also imparted to them the ingredients of a scientific outlook, proficiency in the use of scientific methods and techniques of social and economic analysis. But as critique of the Western theory was not well-developed at that time, and critical perspectives of sociology of knowledge found in the works of Marx, Max Weber, Karl Mannhiem, and others were not always part of the courses of development economics, development politics, and development administration in Western universities; the Western development theory overwhelmed the critical perspectives of Asians trained in the West. [23] Consequently, Asian students, bureaucrats, and scholars returned to their countries with an uncritical attitude toward Western development theory, equipped with intellectual lenses which blurred and distorted the true image of their societies and saturated with bias for the Western development model. A captive mind was born in Asia. [24]

Second, the Western universities provided technical assistance programmes for expanding old universities, building new ones, and for strengthening those departments and branches concerned with development problems. This, of course, helped these universities to upgrade their quality of

teachings, but this assistance also proved a medium for the diffusion of the Western development theory and model. In fact, training

[23] Of course it is not implied here that the effect of local universities or universities in Socialist countries on Asian students and scholars was any better.

[24] Professor Hussain Alatas, a distinguished Asian scholar, commenting on the intellectual attitudes of Asian scholars writes: "There is only a small minority among Asian social scientists who feel the need to develop an autonomous and creative social science tradition relevant to Asia as well as to the general development of the social sciences. The great majority of them were merely extending the use of social sciences, current in Europe and the United States, without the necessary adapation which the very scientific process, if present would tend to call forth. There is here not only a cultural lag in the domain of intellectual consciousness, but also.an indication that in the world of learning, Asian scholars are still under intellectual domination." Syed Hussain Alatas, "The Captive Mind in Development Studies", International Social Science Journal 24(1972): 9-10.

of intellectuals abroad and technical assistance to local universities re-inforced each other in solidifying the hold of Western development theory in Asia. As a consequence of this, Western development theory became the major cognitive map for determining the causes of underdevelopment in Asia and for setting up development goals as well as for selecting strategies. The traditional indigenous theory whatever the level of its intellectual development, influenced only the rightest oppositional political forces, not the policy-making elites.

As a consequence of the unequal relationship between the West and the non-Western countries, the use of technical assistance and foreign aid to promote the diffusion of Western model of development, and the uncritical, imitative and opportunist attitude of some of the Asian political and intellectual elite toward borrowing from the West, no new models of development were developed in Asian countries. Creative learning and synthesis did not take place. Therefore, it is no wonder that inspite of the massive import of technical and financial assistance, most Asian countries continue to remain underdeveloped.

Among the Asian countries only China made a breakthrough; Japan has laid the foundations of its later development in the first phase of Western domination. China was able to achieve this breakthrough precisely because it freed itself from political domination and intellectual servitude. It developed a development theory which reflected as well as adequately explained the realities of Chinese society; [25] it evolved a critical

[25] Mao Tse Tung has said: "There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form, that is Marxism, applied to the concrete conditions, prevailing in China, and not Marxism, abstractly used. If a Chinese communist who is part of the great Chinese people, bound to his people by his very flesh and blood, talks of Marxism apart form Chinese peculiarities, this Marxism is only an

rather than imitative attitude toward other models, especially the Soviet model of development which, for Chinese, was the counterpart of what the Western model was for the rest of Asia. [26] The Chinese leadership acquired great sensitivity to the knowledge about their problems through active and direct participation in the developmental transformation which they attempted to effect. Finally the mass organisation apparatus. which they developed proved an effective mechanism for

the continuous monitoring of internal reality, a mechanism which several Asian countries lacked.

At both project and programme levels there were occasional but infrequent expressions of innovation and creativity. Unfortunately, the experiences of these projects have not been documented and analysed. One notable exception was the rural development programmes of Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (now Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development) located in Comilla. A careful analysis of this project shows that innovation occurred in conditions consistent with the basic hypothesis of this study. [27]

empty abstraction ... We must put an end to writing eight-legged essays on foreign models." See also Franz Schurmann,Ideology and Organisation in Communist china, (Berkeley: University of California, 1971), pp. 24-28.

[26] *.The mfluence of the Soviet model on Chma s thmkmg sharply declined after the mid fifties. See Benjamin Schwartz, "Chinese Development Experience — 1949-72" in Michel Oksenberge, ed. china's Developmental Experience (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 17-27; and Katsuji Nakagane, "Notes on Chinese Model of Economic Development — Its Impact on and Influence from Foreign Economic Systems", Developing Economies 12 (March, 1974): 23-29.*

[27] *See my "A Note on Factors Explaining the Success of Rural Development Programme of Comilla Academy" prepared for a conference on "Communication and Change in Developing Area" organised by*

The uncritical adoption of the Western model in Asia not only retarded creativity and development but in some cases generated serious consequences for internal stability and national integration. Introduction of the Green Revolution within the framework of free enterprise or support for those who had resources to use green revolution technology has, in several Asian countries, disrupted the traditional social order to the breaking point. The "social utility of greed" is becoming critically low. [28] The strategy of selected regional growth, of favouring regions which were better endowed in resources, organisation and attitudes, under the influence of the Western model, produced regional inequalities and impoverishment of the poorer regions. This led to serious internal political tensions threatening political stability and civil order and in some cases to secessionist movements. At least in one case, Pakistan, such a movement was able to break up a country. The price for looking at reality with borrowed intellectual lenses in this case was indeed high.

Institute of Mass Communications of East-West Center, Honolulu. on January 11-16, 1975.

[28] *.This is reference to a chapter heading in a book by Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan 's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentü'e (Oxford University Press, 1967) in which he eulogises the positive social consequences of indiviudal greed, a doctrine rooted in classical economics. It would be interesting to speculate to what extent the adoption of this doctrine by Ayub regime led to its downfall. The regime supported the rural landlord who was dominant in local government and national legislative institutions at the cost of the rural lower classes and the urban lower and middle classes whose revolt led to the downfall of the regime.*

The Third Phase in Western and Non-Western Relations

The conditions which distorted the learning process between the West and non-Western societies have recently begun to change. The most crucial among these are the change in the international power structure, the emergence of a serious critique of Western development theory, and a change in attitudes towards cultural exchange and intellectual borrowing. The emergence of these conditions has altered the traditional context of Asia's reliance on the West for borrowing development models and make possible the emergence of authentic development models suited to the development of Asian societies. Whether this opportunity is realised depends upon several factors to analyse in this section.

The most crucial development of far reaching implications for the human community is the basic structural change in the distribution of international power from a bipolar power structure to multipolar power structure. This change is reflected in the military withdrawal of the United States from Asia, admission of China to the United Nations, greater independence of the European community from the United States, the emergence of regional organisations such as Asean [29] and the Islamic secretariat, [30] greater unanimity on significant issues by the Third World countries as reflected in the decisions of

[29] Y. Hagiwara, "Formation and Development of Association of Southeast Asian Nations", *The Developing Economies (December 1973), 11:4 pp 443-465.*

[30] See M. Kamlin, "The Islamic Conference System: Its Origin, Purposes, and Prospects" ,Jernal Hubongan Antarabangsa 2(1974/75, University of Malaya): 44-62

the United Nations General Assembly sessions of 1974, and the successful use of the cartel technique by oil producing countries which, in one stroke, has effected a significant redistribution of international wealth. [31]

As a result of these changes, interest in as well as possibility of dividing the world into distinct ideological camps has considerably diminished. The foreign aid and technical assistance programmes are now becoming less subordinate to the foreign policy interests of the superpowers than was formerly the case during the Fifties and Sixties. Both the need as well as desire to induce developing countries to accept development models as part of a technical assistance package, has also diminished. Besides, with the availability of multiple, and not necessarily coordinated sources of technical assistance, the range of choice for Asian countries has increased. [32]

Not only is there less insistence on exporting Western development model, but to an extent the old attitude toward other development models is also changing. Establishment of direct contacts between the United States and China, and greater knowledge of Chinese development experience have changed the attitude of a significant part of the Western scholarly community, especially in the

United States, toward the relevance of Western and Chinese models of development for developing countries. Doubts about the value for Asian development of Western experience as well as an appreciation of the relevance

[31] Ralph Braibanti, "Conceptual Pre-requisites for the Evolution of Asian Bureaucratic Systems" in Inayatullah, ed., Management Training for Development: The Asian Experience (Kuala Lumpur: The Asian Centre for Development Administration, 1975), pp. 188-196.

[32] Ibid

of the Chinese development experience to Asian problems have increased. [33] This has created intellectual reverberations in Asia as well. Open discussion and comparison of Chinese and Western models and the recognition that some features of the Chinese model are more applicable to Asian problems is no longer a taboo in Asian countries. With the emergence of this new intellectual posture and a new vigorous competitive model on the intellectual horizons of Asia, uncritical commitment by Asian intellectuals and political elite to the Western development model is likely to diminish even further.

The emergence of several regional training and research institutions such as the Asian Development Institute, Bangkok, and the Asian Centre for Development Administration, Kuala Lumpur, has provided a new framework for the development of a more inventive and less imitative intellectual posture toward development models. This posture is likely to be appreciative of the need for developing alternative models and strategies of development. The basic mandate of the Asian Centre for Development Administration, for instance, is to encourage in Asian countries a sense of self-reliance, inculcate an attitude of learning from mutual experiences, and stimulate inventiveness. [34]

[33] Wilbur Schramm et. al., "China's Experience with Development Communication. How transferable is it?", a paper presented to a Conference on "Communication and Change in Developing Areas —Ten Years After", organised by Institute of Communication, East-West Center, Honolulu, 13-17 January, 1975, and Oksenberg, op.cit. also Braibanti, op.cit.

[34] Three of the four criteria used by ACDA to determine its programme priorities include adaptation of administrative ideas and technology to local circumstances, development of concepts and approaches appropriate to Asian needs, and the facilitation of experimenting

Another significant development reflecting the desire of the Third World intellectuals to seek intellectual liberation from ethnocentric elements of Western development theory and to inculcate intellectual self-reliance has occurred with the emergence of the Third World Forum - an organisation of Third World social scientists formally established at a meeting in Karachi (Pakistan) held on January 5-10, 1975. The Communique issued at the end of Karachi meeting stressed "the need for a continued intellectual revolution to overcome the dependence of the Third World and for profound changes in the internal and external order that the developing countries face today". [35]

with new ideas and approaches. See ECAFE, "Programme Framework for Asian Centre for Development Administration: Conclusions of the Meeting of Administrators and Specialists in Development Adrninistration

in Asia", Bangkok, 1972, p. 10. Earlier a panel constituted by the ECAFE Executive Secretary to develop a plan of operation for ACDA noted: "The Panel indicated concern regarding the probelm of transplanting administrative techniques and methods developed elsewhere under different cultural patterns, in such a manner as to suit the specific indigenous circumstances. The result of neglecting the need for suitable adaptation had been the serious cultural and communication lags and imbalances. Many such techniques currently in use in administrations had been inadequately grafted into the differing administrative patterns, It was, therefore, considered important by the Panel that practices and methods developed elsewhere should be studied in greater depth with a view to making them more viable and applicable in terms of the specific characteristics of the countries." ECAFE, "Report of the Panel of Experts on Regional Center for Development Administration", Bangkok December 1969 (mimeo), p.4.

[35] In an opening statement to the Conference of the Forum in Karachi, Mr. Mahbub ul Haq, renowned World Bank economist, characterised the role of Forum as follows:

The significance of these developments for intellectual self-reliance of the Third World is further enhanced by a crisis developing in Western development theory, due partly to its internal developments and partly to changes in external conditions. [36] Eisenstadt, a distinguished sociologist who has himself made significant contributions to this theory, reviewing the developments in this theory during last several decades has declared "The End of A Paradigm". [37] Criticism of the traditional development theory has led to the following shifts in its basic postulates:

> *"The Third World Forum constitutes a movement for intellectual self-reliance. On a national level, it marks a search for finding our own solutions within our own value systems. On an international level, it is an effort to organise the Third World intellectually to fight for its just demands in all international forums." "The Third World Forum: Intellectual Self-Reliance", **International Development Review** 17L1975): 10.*

The Communique rferred above in the text proposed that the Forum "provide a platform for an exchange of views on alternative development strategies, and intellectual support for the Third World for devising their policy options", "stimulate relevant socio-economic research through regional and national research institutes", "seek to influence appropriate international regional and national decision-making bodies to recognise and protect the legitimate rights and interests of the people of the Third World", "identify areas for mutual cooperation and interdependence", and finally "express views on international issues affecting the Third World and its relations with the developed world", Thid, pp. 11-12.

[36] It is significant testimony of the thesis of Mannhiem and other sociologists of knowledge that perspectives underlying social science theories are influenced and shaped by the facts of power distribution. The crisis in Western development theory has occurred exactly at a time when international political hegemony of the West has been effectively curtailed.

[37] S.N. Eisenstandt's paper entitled "End of a Paradigm" circulated in the Conference on Communication and Change, op. cit. He has presented

Table I
Comparison of Old and Emerging Sets of Postulates about Development

	Old Paradigm		Emerging Consensus
1.	Modernization and development is a unilinear and universal process. The developing societies can become modern by travelling the same path and by	1.	Modernization can be multi- linear and culture and historic specific. There is no end plateau of modernity, which when arrived at, would ensure that every modern

	passing through the same stages as the old Western societies.		society becomes a replica of earlier modern societies. New societies become modern by travelling diverse paths.
2.	The basic criterion of modernity is the acquisition of behavioural patterns associated with contemporary Western industrial societies.	2.	Criteria of modernity is an unfolding of potentialities of societies in their specific cultural and historical context.
3.	"Modernity and tradition represent mutually exclusive, functionally inter-	3.	Modernity and tradition have complex relationships; they are sometimes ant-

a similar theme in "The Changing Vision of Modernization and Development", mimeographed. Another scholar reviewing this theory comes to similar conclusions: "But whatever the ultimate shape which an eventual alternative to modernization theory might take, it will require a fundamental rethinking of how we approach the analysis of long term, macro-level transformations of societies. The results of almost two decades of modernization theory do not justify a third. The time has come to begin working toward an alternative paradigm." Tipps, op.cit. p.224. See also Huntington, "Change to Change" op.cit, and Apter and Mushi, op.cit.

	dependent clusters of attributes". [38] The more a society becomes modem the more it has to divest itself of traditional elements.		gonistic, sometimes compatible, sometimes reinforcing. The earlier modern societies are not pure "modern" types, but a mixture of tradition and modernity. The new societies become modern by developing a unique cluster of modern and traditional attributes
4.	Factors retarding development lie within a society. External environments are generally benevolent and facilitative.	4.	The nature of the international setting of a society has determining effects on its prospects for development. For contemporary developing societies, this setting is a mixture of be - nevolence and malevolence [39]

These changes in the Western development theory have dented its old biases of ethnocentric gradation, exaggerated universality, and exclusive internal causation. The prospects for the emergence of a better development theory seem now to be improving.

Partly as a consequence of challenge to the old paradigm of modernization and partly due to an accumulation of direct empirical evidence about the ineffectiveness of the strategies of development consistent with the old

paradigm, a shift is occurring in concrete strategies of development as described below:

[38] Tipps, op.czt. p. 214.
[39] Hopkins op.cit.; Tipps, op. cit; Goulet, op. cit.

Table 2

Comparison of Strategies of Development

Old Strategies		New Emerging Strategies	
1.	Primary responsibility of their development is on individual nations though more developed countries should assist the less developed countries through bilateral or multilateral aid.	1.	The primary responsibility for development is on each nation itself but "economic and social progress is the common and shared responsibility of the entire international community". 40 The efforts of less developed countries can succeed only within the context of "a more just and rational world economic and social order in which equality of opportunities should be as much prerogative of nations as of individuals within a nation". [41]
2.	Stress on the increased flow of capital, technologies, and skills from rich nations to poor nations.	2.	Stress on changes in terms of trade and redistribution of global wealth 42 through special measures.

[40] United Nations, International Development Strategy: Action Programme of the General Assembly for the Second United Nations Development Decade(New York, United Nations, 1970), p.3.
[41] Ibid

[42] United Nations, Towards Accelerated Development: Proposal for the Second United Nations Development Decade, (New York: United Nations, 1970), pp. 22-28; Mahbub ul Haq, "The Crisis in Development

3.	Mobilization of resources and efforts in poor countries through demonstration effect of rich nations and through setting up of development objectives comparable to the rich nations.	3.	Mobilization of resources and efforts in poor countries by setting up realistic objectives of development. [43]
4.	Encouragement of growth through "big push" or selective growth strategies with the assumption that distribution will	4.	Frontal attack on poverty on the assumption that growth and distribution of benefits are directly correlated. [44]

	be taken care of by other societal processes.		

Strategies," in Chales K. Wilbur, ed. The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment(New York: Random House, r973), pp. 37 1-272.

[43] *Malibub ul Haq, op. cit., p.368.*

[44] *"As the ultimate purpose of development is to provide increasing opportunities to all people for a better life, it is essential to bring about a more equitable distribution of income and wealth for promoting both social justice and efficiency of production. Thus, qualitative and structural changes in the society must go hand in hand with rapid economic growth, and existing disparities -- regional, sectoral, and social -- should be substantially reduced. These objectives are both determining factors and end-results of development", United Nations, International Development Strategy: Action Programme of the General Assembly for the Second United Nations Development Decade (New York, 1970), p.4; "It is fallacy that more rapid growth and reduction of inequalities of income and wealth are necessarily competing elements". United Nations, Towards Accelerated Development: Proposal for the Second United Nations Development Decade*

5.	Stress on modernization of elite to enhance their capacity to manage development, and on building new institutions which are vehicles of diffusion of derived and borrowed technology with marginal adaptation.	5.	Stress on mobilization, organization and participation of masses in development, on decentralization of decision-making, [45] stress on indigenisation, [46] self-reliance and local creativity, on development of appropriate technology. [47]

The changes in basic premises of the old paradigm of modernization and strategies of development have profound implications for the relevance of foreign development models to the process of development in non-Western societies. The acceptance of the fact that modernization is a historically and culturally specific process throws serious doubts on the relevance of any foreign model of development evolved in different cultural and historic circumstances. It places the main burden

(New York: United Nations, 1970), p.11. See also Robert S. McNamara, "Address to the Board of Governors", (Washington, D.C., IBRD, 1972), pp. 8-9. "The new development strategies, therefore, must reject the thesis that poverty can be attacked indirectly through the growth rates filtering down to the masses. It must be based on the premise that poverty must be attacked directly' Mahbub ul Haq, p. 369. Also see Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development" in Charles K. Wilbur, ed. The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, op.cit. pp. 6-13. Denis Goulet, The Cruel Choice op. cit. and Sugata Dasgupta, "Towards a No Poverty Society" in Effective Anti-Poverty Strategies (Bangkok: Union Publishing, 1973).

45 *Edgar Owens and Robert Shaw, Development Reconsidered (Delhi Heath & Co., 1972).*

46 *.Braibanti, op. cit., pp. 211-215 m.*

[47] *. Ibid.*

of evolving an appropriate model of development on a society itself, by examining what it can learn and maintain from its own history and culture, by full

comprehensionof the constraints and opportunities available in its internal and external environments. The role of external assistance should be not to become substitute for local creativity, but rather to create a benevolent environment free from external domination and exploitation and free from "structural paternalism" and "vulnerability". [48]

[48] *Goulet, op.cit., pp. 38.59*

VI

Constraints on Choices for Constructing New Development Models

Within the context of the changed international power structure, and a newly emergent consensus of concept and theory of development, what type of development model or models would emerge in Asia? What type of cultural and institutional changes will be necessary to incorporate new strategies of development? What aspects of the history and culture of Asian societies can be maintained or revived and incorporated within these models? What is the future of Western development model in Asia? What elements of this model will remain relevant? What elements of it will be rejected?

To answer such questions one must make the following assumptions:

1). That changes in the international power structure will continue in the direction of greater diffusion of power and multi-polarization. Consequently, the Asian political elite will be less constrained by external factors in making an autonomous choice about appropriate development models and development policies;

2). That with the emergence of regional institutions, with greater contacts between Asian political and intellectual elites, with greater exchange of knowledge about each other's development experiences, mutual learning in Asia and consequently creativity will be accelerated;

3). That Asian intellectuals will develop a critical-analytical orientation which will enable them to develop a body of knowledge relevant for the understanding of their countries' problems. [49]

[49] *The three assumptions may not hold true in future. First, the high military capability of the West, its economic control of non-Western*

The search for the elements of a new development model would occur in Asia in the context of three basic constraints:

1). The constraints of increasing scarcity;

2).   The constraints of the historical legacy of each Asian society;

3).   The constraints of the contemporary international setting.

These constraints would narrow the range of choice in development models and a number of options would be foreclosed. The effects of the first two constraints will be discussed in this section, that of the third in the subsequent section.

1.   The Constraints of Scarcities

The Asian societies function within the constraints of acute scarcity. Both the absolute and relative scarcity is likely to increase as population multiplies, more and more land and other resources are brought under control and used at increasing costs, and as inequalities in distribution supported by the

economies, and possibility of internal difference among non-Western societies may not permit greater diffusion of power. The second assumption regarding the facilitation of mutual learning in Asian countries may also not prove true. Due to pie-existing mutual fears and conflicts, contact between Asian countries may not develop further. Finally, one should not be too optimistic about intellectual autonomy, and the liberation of Asian intellectuals. The deep impact of foreign training and education as well as ideologies do not wear off easily. The bureaucratisation of intellectuals in Aisa which ensure sterile conformity with the dictates of the political elite or resentful rejection of a constructive role in development may also continue.

existing inegalitarian social and power structure multiply. With greater demonstration effect, and the information explosion brought about by rapidly diffusing mass media, with greater physical and social movements, the sense of relative deprivation is both likely to increase and to be considered an intolerable situation. The imbalance between what Lerner calls the get— want ratio is likely to become acute. [50]

In facing the challenge of scarcity within the contemporary context, certain options which were available to early modernizing societies are no longer available to Asian societies. They neither have the option of expanding into other countries to secure raw material and a captive market, nor that of further squeezing their peasantry and working class. Simultaneous incorporation of lower classes into the political process, the weakening of traditional institutions and ideologies which sedated and contained their demands as well as ensured at least their toleration of the existing social and economic regimes if not their support, has shortened the time span available for eliminating intolerable scarcities. The option of earlier modernizing societies to keep their lower classes asleep over a long period of time till greater surplus has been generated does not seem to be available to Asian societies. The authoritarian and repressive response of containing the demands of lower classes, and squeezing the economic surplus, a response which was available to some European societies, is probably not available to Asian societies due primarily to the reason that they do not possess the repressive capacity needed for this purpose. [51]

[50] Danial Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory" in Lucian W.Pye ed. *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton: New Jersey, Princeton Univeristy Press, 1963), pp. 333-334.

[51] For an excellent comparative analysis of differences in historical circumstances of Western and Asian societies, see Barrington Moore, *Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, Mass: Beacon Pr ss, 1966) and Ronald P. Dore, "The Late Development Effect" and

Within the constraints of time and the social situation confronting them, the Asian societies have to undergo a significant organisational and institutional transformation to achieve the goals of development. Such transformation, to be effective, requires consensus regarding the goals guiding such a transformation, mobilizing and organising the populace to achieve these goals effectively and overcoming resistance emerging from the interests committed to the maintenance of the status quo.

2.   The Historical Constraints

There are two basic elements,the pre-Western historical, cultural and institutional legacy and the impact of the West during colonialism that have shaped the historical evolution of Asian societies. Four major religious traditions, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism and Confucianism have influenced the thought patterns, and social organisation of Asian societies. These traditions in some countries co-exist, in other countries conflict with each other, but in any case affect the current behaviour as well as norms of the elite and the masses.[52] In addition, at least four Asian countries, China, India, Indonesia and Japan. evolved a classical society with an elaborate and complex social structure, a centralized political framework and a relatively well organised bureaucracy; the remnants of this classical heritage, to an extent, continue to influence current modes of behaviour.

More recently, Asian societies have been deeply influenced and changed by Western impact. All public institutions

Goh Keng Swee "Economic Development and Modernization in SouthEast Asia" in *Modernisation in South-East Asia*, op.cit. pp. 65.80, and 81-96 respectively.

[52] Donald E. Smith (ed.), *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

such as the bureaucratic, economic and political, educational system, the class and power structure, and ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism and socialism, bear the deep imprint of the West. The mixture of classical heritage and Western impact on Asian societies has produced a unique pattern in each society. The influence of this pattern on choices about future development models will be considerable.

(a).   Pre- Western Historical Legacy and its Impact

The traditional symbols and behaviour are involved in the functioning of a society in a complex way. They provide an anchor for integrative bonds and rescue the individual and the society from disintegration under acute stress. Under appropriate circumstances, they mobilize energies for development purposes, provide an anchor for integrative bonds and rescue the individual and the society from disintegration under acute stress. Under appropriate circumstances, they mobilize energies for development purposes, provide an image of a good society and a normative order against which the current realities should be measured and changed. However, the traditional symbols and behaviour can also be disintegrative as for instance when they show intolerance for those who do not share them and when they limit the learning capacity of a society by consecrating certain traditional attitudes and institutions which need to be changed or when they sanction dissociation between religious virtue and worldly activity. [53]

The different extent to which traditional symbols and behaviour persist in different Asian societies is due to not only differences in the nature of their traditions and their capacity to adjust to new social imperatives but also to the different problems confronting these societies. Unlike, for

[53] Robert N. Bellah, "Epilogue: Religion and Progress inModemAsia" in Robert N. Bellah, ed. Religion and Progress in Modern Asia (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1965), pp. 168-194.

instance, culturally homogenous societies such as China, Japan and Korea, the heterogenous societies such as Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia, torn by various ethnic loyalties and particularisms, would find it difficult to totally replace their traditional symbols with modern secular symbols, especially where these traditional symbols are the only bond of integration. Similarly, in heterogenous societies in which traditional symbols bind a majority or a near majority group which is attempting to recover from a weak political and economic position would tend to elevate these symbols into national symbols until their position in the political community is fully secure as for instance in the case of the Buddhist Singhalese in Sri Lanka and Muslim Malays in Malaysia. This could, of course, create new integrative problems. Furthermore, traditional symbols would not be abandoned in a society if they were re-inforced by rewards of prestige flowing from a part of the international community, as for instance is the case for symbols of Islamic identity in several Asian countries, which has been re-inforced by a resurgence of feelings for Islamic *millat,* or as was the case with Christian Philippines identifying with the powerful and progressive Christian West.

On the other hand, the revival of traditional symbols in heterogenous societies in which such a revival confirms the domination in other fields by a significant majority would be costly for national political unity as for instance would be the case with India, the Philippines and Thailand, where extension of Hindu, Christian and Buddhist symbols respectively in public sphere would heighten the alienation of Muslim minorities in these countries.

The role of tradition beyond the sphere of symbols and attitudes and in the sphere of various institutions would also differ in different societies, depending upon the relative rigidity or flexibility of those institutions. However, a few general conclusions may be formulated. First, the full revival of the institutions of an historical and a mythical society or their persistence in fully intact form, would probably be impossible and unlikely in any Asian society regardless of the level of commitment of the revivalists. However, the hiatus between tradition and modernity need not be over-emphasized as frequently the revivalist looks at tradition with a contemporary normative perspective, picking up those elements which are modern in spirit, and attaching traditional symbols to them Even where commitment to the persistence or revival of pure traditional institutions on an ideological level is strong, it is considerably diluted at the level of concrete programmes of action as contemporary internal and external environments exert their pressure. Besides, many traditional institutions functioning within the contemporary environment could evolve a modern and developmental role as for instance is the case with castes in India. [54] There are at least four cultural and institutional spheres in which the persistence or revival of the traditional outlook or institutions, if attempted, would lead to the worsening of social and economic inequalities, greater social and political unrest, and a slower pace of development.

First, it would be impossible for many Asian societies to fully revive or maintain their traditional *Weltanschauung;* the basic attitudes toward nature, self, and society. This would. be possible only if all intellectual and cultural activities in a society are made subservient to traditionalism; the modern rational-analytical-empirical attitude toward nature, self, and society is abandoned, and the fruits of modern science and technology are foregone. With the challenge of scarcity facing Asian societies, this would be an impossible choice. However, a loose integration of the scientific and traditional outlooks appears not only possible but probably very likely, as has been the case in Western societies which have been able to establish a detente, though an uneasy one, between science and Christianity. However, where the tradition proves too inflexible to accommodate new demands, a total rejection of the traditional

[54] Lloy I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1967), pp. 19-28.

outlook may become inevitable as it has, for instance, happened in China.

Second, traditional attitudes towards material deprivation and poverty would be difficult to maintain or revive. The traditional physical and social isolation which formerly sustained a static status and power structure re-inforcing these attitudes, has broken down. Fewer poor, in the future, will accept their

poverty and deprivation as divinely ordained or supernaturally pre-determined and eternal.

Third, traditional legitimation of social and economic inequalities between the elite and the non-elite, the rich and the poor, which some Asian traditional cultural values supported, is increasingly weakening and would be impossible to revive. Despite the persistence of the social inequalities prevalent in some Asian societies, these inequalities are continuously under attack and remain undefended. Their protagonists consider them as a transitional phenomena and defend them more frequently in the name of order and stability or development and growth and less frequently in the name of a moral or transcendental order. [55] On the other hand, it is the ideologies that aim at removing poverty which appeal to the poor and secure their votes. It is the ideology of "Islamic socialism" in Pakistan rather than that of Islamic revivalism that wins the political battle. It is the "Gharibi Hatao" (remove poverty) campaign which wins political support in India.

Finally, the anti-industrial and anti-technology option of development is also closed and cannot be used to evolve an effective response to the problems of scarcity. There would be debates about effective strategies of industrialisation. There would be room for evolving appropriate technologies to avoid the social, and cultural disruptions which modern technology

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[55] *Ibid, pp. 103-132.*

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creates when introduced in traditional social systems. But without some variant of modern technology, and a certain degree of industrialisation and concomitant social change, the huge Asian population cannot be freed from the poverty which the Asian poor find intolerable.

(b). Relevance of Western Development Model

The effect of the Western model on development policies and models in Asian societies has thus far been exerted through internal mechanisms such as through educational system, professional classes trained in the West, bureaucracy and pro-Western political groups, and external inducements and pressure through the tying of aid to the adoption of the Western model. It appears that in the future this effect will be less strongly exerted through external rather than internal mechanisms, though a generalised commitment of internal supporters of the Western model will probably decline. Of the two components of the Western model, the cultural and institutional, the effect of the former will be stronger than the latter. The cultural component incorporates a rational-analytical-empirical approach to the understanding of nature, society and self, a pervasive secular outlook on public affairs and a quest for the continuous improvement and perfection of technology. Detached from its institutional component, the cultural component of the Western model has diffused

throughout many contemporary societies. Generally at the level of the elite, this component has been accepted and absorbed irrespective of ideological divisions, and provides an intellectual underpinning to the task of development planners and policy-makers. This cultural component may be in conflict with some tradftional religious orientations in Asia, but it is unlikely that these orientations could overwhelm the Western cultural component to a sufficiently strong extent as to totally replace it.

Of the four elements of the institutional component of the Western model, capitalism, liberal democracy, nation- state, and neutral and rational public bureaucracy, the relevance of the first two to Asian development problems has become relatively less certain. The classical capitalism fostered economic development in the West under circumstances radically different from those of contemporary Asian societies. Initially it produced acute inequalities which the West was able to somehow manage, something which contemporary Asian societies would be unable to do due to the change in their context. The poorer classes in Asian societies are relatively mobilized and at least nominally exert some influence on the political process. Radical egalitarian ideologies exist which in times of stress are likely to appeal to the Asian masses and win their loyalties. Besides, the strategy of a capitalistic approach to the distribution of benefits of economic development requires a social structure relatively free from internal social rigidities which the Asian societies, sharply divided into rural urban, modern-traditional and other kinds of divisions, do not possess. Finally, the capitalistic approach requires a relatively longer period of automatic redistribution of benefits, a time span not available to Asian societies with their rapidly increasing population, limited resources and restive citizenry.

The relevance of liberal democracy to the problems faced by Asian societies has also become doubtful: this is evident to an extent, from democracy's failure to take roots in Asian soil. First, to face the challenge of scarcities, as noted earlier, Asian societies need a significant social structural transformation, a high degree of consensus on developmental goals, and a high level of mobilizational and administrative capacity to achieve them. Within the framework of liberal democracy, it is difficult to achieve these transformations and generate the needed capacities. First, in liberal democracy political power accumulates in the hands of those who hold economic power and social privileges, and whose interests are linked with the status quo. Second, liberal democracy functions effectively only within a social structure characterized by a given combination of horizontal and vertical integration, 56 which due to weak linkages between different classes in Asian societies, is not present.

Finally, the chances of liberal democracy's survival in societies which have not effectively settled their identity problems and are furthermore continuously beset by problems of autonomy seeking and secessionist movements cannot be high. Liberal democracy can indeed function with a consensus on definition of community and public good and dissensus on the

means. But in societies where this consensus does not exist or is continuously eroded by acute disagreement on ultimate values, the chances of survival of liberal democracy are not considered to be too good. [58]

At the concrete historical level the only successful model of development combining Western cultural attitudes with capitalism and liberal democracy in Asia is Japan. But its lessons may not be considered applicable to other Asian countries as the Japanese, like the European process of development, started much earlier in the 19th century and its earlier phase occurred not under a democratic but an authoritarian regime. Asian elite may argue that they could afford the luxury of a liberal democracy only after they have achieved the level of economic development of pre-Second World War Japan.

[56] *S.M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963, Anchor Book edition), pp. 76-77.*

[57] *Leonard Binder, et. al. Crisis and Sequence in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).*

[58] *For a similar assessment of prospects of liberal democracy in Asia though not based on exactly similar arguments, see Edward Shils "Fortunes of Constitutional Government in the Political Development of the New States" in John H. Hallowell,ed. Development for What? (Durham, N.C. 1964), pp. 102-143.*

In contrast to the Japanese model, the Chinese model probably would exercise greater appeal to Asian minds in the future. If the present trend continues, political and cultural relations between China and other Asian countries are likely to increase, and with this more valid assessment of Chinese achievements, especially their successes in eliminating poverty, inequalities, extending welfare services and an adequate level of agricultural growth would become available to Asia. [59] Special cultural features of this model such as discipline, austerity, collectivity orientation and some special institutional aspects such as the decentralized structure of decision-making and the self-sufficiency of ascending territorial units are likely to compel the attention of Asian elite struggling with the overwhelming problem of scarcity.

A third institutional element of the Western model is the nation-state organised on the principle that a people constituting a nation should govern themselves and exercise sovereignty within a given territory. Since the Second World War, the nation- state enshrined in the UN charter has been the building block of the contemporary international order as well as an important factor in the formulation of the foreign policies of nations and conduct of international relations. The non-Western nations in general have willingly accepted this order and in fact used the ideology of nationalism to overthrow colonial rule.

The nation-state in contemporary history is being threatened both from within and without. From within, the stimulation of politically oriented ethnic awareness has created pressure to break up established nation-states in at least

half a dozen Asian countries. From without, increasing encroachment of international and transnational organisations, greater functional interdependence and greater intervention in the internal affairs of weak nations by powerful nations have nibbled away at the elusive concept of sovereignty. Occasionally, transnational

[59] Oksenberg, op.cit., and Schramm, et. al., op. cit.

allegiance of ethnic minorities, and external support to such minorities from other sympathetic states sharing with these minorities certain cultural characteristics have further weakened the sovereignty of nation-states. Consequently, the future of the nation-state in Asia, and probably in the world, is not as certain today as it was a few decades ago. However, as the self interest of the Asian elite would necessitate that they uphold the concept of the nation-state, it would continue to influence both their external as well as their internal policies, though in actual application the concept is likely to undergo significant changes.

The fourth institutional component of the Western model is a politically neutral, instrumentally-oriented public bureaucracy which is assumed to efficiently implement decisions made by the representative institutions and which is recruited on the basis of merit and professional qualifications. Public bureaucracies in many Asian countries developed in the context of Western colonial rule, and, in many cases, post-independence Western technical assistance programmes have attempted to strengthen them, technically modernize them and give them a liberal democratic ideological bias through local and foreign training. As a consequence, they became an "overdeveloped" superstructure, both in the colonial and post-colonial societies, assuming a political role especially in those Asian countries where the political institutions were underdeveloped. 60 From this position of power they directed the development of society in such a way as not to curtail their power and privileges and in some cases, even to enlarge and perpetuate them. Their assumption of the position of a major actor or as the sole dominant

[60] For a good discussion of the role of public bureaucracy in development from a liberal democratic perspective, see Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View" in Joseph LaPalombara ecL, Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), Ch. V. For a good analysis of the issue from socialistic perspective, see Haniza Alavi, "Bangladesh and the Crisis of Pakistan", Socialist Register, 1971, pp. 289-317.

force in the national political arena considerably affected their structural and behavioural characteristics, contrary to those implied in the liberal democratic model. During the post-colonial period, this deviation was further accentuated as the insulation provided by the colonial framework broke down, thereby allowing the penetration of kinship and other ascriptive criteria, as well as the accommodation of the demands of ethnic minorities to seek equal representation

in the public bureaucracy on matters affecting the selection and recruitment of public officials.

In future, as problems caused by scarcities increase, and as the economically and politically deprived classes in society seek a change in the social order through militant political action, the public bureaucracy is increasingly likely to act as a partisan force either protecting the status quo or aiming to expand its political power. On the other hand, the political groups seeking radical reconstruction of their societies are likely to force the bureaucracy to assume an instrumental role, and, where possible to make an ideological commitment to the radical programmes to be implemented. In either case, the public bureaucracy in Asia is less likely to conform to the normative pattern of the classical Western model.

VII

Constraints of International Setting

The issue of the relevance of a development model is usually conceived in the context of removing endogenous constraints on the development of a society or a nation - state by following the appropriate model. In a sense, this issue has become less important as it is being increasingly accepted that exogenous constraints emerging from international environment play a critical role in the development of countries, and, unless a beneficial international environment is created, the development of the less developed countries will not occur. Within the context of this new approach, the issue of which model of development is appropriate for a nation is no more crucial than the issue of which is an appropriate model for reconstituting the international political and economic order for ensuring balanced development of the human community and the speedy development of poorer countries.

Some of the crucial constraints emerging from the international setting which have continuously limited, or distorted, the autonomous process of development in poor countries are the following:

A first set of contraints emerges from the economic specialisation of the world economy, patterns of foreign capital investment, the operations of the so-called multinational corporations, [61] and the patterns of international trade and

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[61] *The concept "multinational" does not correctly characterise the structure of control of these corporations and gives the misleading idea that these corporations are controlled by many nations. In fact, as Huntington has documented, generally the control of these corporations is vested in the nationals of only one country. In U.S. based multinational corporations, for instance, it is reported that approximately 21 percent of their employees, but only 1.5 percent of their managers, are non-Americans. Huntington, 7)-wig- wtional Oiganisations, op. cit. p. 353.*

terms of trade. [62] These constraints reduce the choices available to poor countries, make them sateffites of the dominant core economies, distribute international wealth to their disadvantage and expose them to a high degree of external manipulation and structural vulnerability. As the level of interdependence in the world economy rises further and those portions of the economy hitherto not under the influence of the international economy come within its orbit, and especially as the area of operations of multinational corporations expands, the vulnerability of the poor countries would further increase making it less and less possible for them to develop in accordance with a

[62] *A recent UNC TAD study has brought out the fact that terms of trade have been going against the poor countries from 1953 to 1972 at an annual average rate of 2.2 percent, New Straits limes (Kuala Lumpur), July 19, 1975. On the effects of international trade on Asian economies, see R. Hirono, "Changing Patterns of Economic Interdependence in Asia",, Developing Economies (December, 1973) 11:4, pp. 325-362, and Gun Mishikawa, "Toward Economic Independence of Southeast Asia", ibid., pp. 466-485. On international corporations see United Nations, Multinational Corporations in World Development (New York, United Nations, 1973) and The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations New York, United Nations, 1974); Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organisations in World Pblitics", op. cit., and Robert B. Stauffer, "Nation Building in a Global Economy: The role of Multinational Corporations", (Comparative Politics Series, eds. Hasty Eckstein et. al., Vol. 4, 1973). On structural vulnerability see Goulet, The Cruel Choice, op. cit., Keith Griffin, "Under-development in History", in Wilbur, The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, op. cit., 68-81. C.R. Hensman, Rich Against The Poor: The Reality of AID (London: The Penguine Press, 1971), Richard Jolly "International Dimensions" in Hollis Chenery, et. al. Redistribution with Growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 158-180.*

self-determined development design. [63]

A second set of constraints emerged from the structure of international power. The international power structure imposed and continues to impose on the poor countries a subservient international status resulting in obsequious international political behaviour which had negative political and economic consequences for them. It distorted the process of internal political development as the elites subservient to external pressure were rewarded and supported while autonomous elites were subverted. It brought certain political groups, especially the military and civil bureaucracies greater political power and ossified a power structure which was not conducive to national development.

Finally, there are the ideological and intellectual constraints. As has been analysed in earlier sections of this paper, foreign development theories and models come with a package of financial and technical assistance, and cultural exchange programmes, which become a substitute for autonomously developed analysis of development problems and policies.

The chances of developing authentic models of development in Asian countries and consequently of accelerating their development would not improve unless the structural impediments in the path of underdeveloped

countries which emerge from the international setting are removed. This could be effectively done only when the international economic and political order is reconstructed on a new set of assumptions replacing the old assumptions about international cooperation.

[63] *See on this point especially with regard to science and technology becoming instruments of exploitation of the poor countries by those dominant in the international economy, Joseph Kuitenbrouwer, "Science and Technology: For or Against the People", (Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, Occasional Papers No. 49 (June 1975).*

The traditional assumption that the underdevelopment of certain regions or classes in a country is caused purely by their own action and that its removal is therefore their own responsibility has been generally discarded in favour of the assumption that underdevelopment of a part of a country is a consequence of the total situation of the country, and that therefore the less developed regions and classes should be provided with special opportunities to develop, created through positive societal action. A similar change in the traditional assumption about the causes of underdevelopment at the international level should be effected by replacing it with the new assumption that underdevelopment is neither caused solely by the poor countries themselves nor can it be removed by them alone. In the words of Maurice Strong, Secretary General of the UN Conference on Human Environment; "In effect, we must extend into international life the principles of distributive justice and minimum opportunities for all that are accepted as the basis for relations between rich and poor in most national societies today".[64]

The incorporation of this principle would require constructing a whole set of new relationships between the developed and the less developed countries. It would require not only the development of a new pattern of international trade in which the products of the poor countries could compete in the internal market of the developed countries free of barriers and restrictions but also that the institutional capacity of the poor countries is strengthened to secure favourable terms of trade. This may require greater economic cooperation and organisation among the poor countries, as well as greater coordination of policies and action. The efficacy of this strategy has already been demonstrated to an extent by the results of the concerted action of the OPEC countries.

The removal of international constraints on authentic autonomous development would also require re-examination

[64] Maurice Strong, *Saturday Review/World* (December 14, 1974), p.11.

of the role of foreign and technical assistance with respect to its impact on poor countries. Due to the subordination of such assistance, especially in bilateral

form, to the political and economic interests of the donor countries, it has generally not stimulated the autonomous development process in most aid receiving countries and has not relieved them of the necessity for further aid. In any case, the amount of official development assistance during the sixties and early seventies from the rich to the poor countries has been too marginal to produce any significant effects on poor countries. [65] Consequently, the continuous reliance of the poor countries on foreign financial and technical assistance in preference to the creation of a new and just economic order, is unlikely to help them break through the vicious circle of underdevelopment. If foreign aid can play a certain role in this process, both its magnitude as well as its mode of administration, need to be changed in significant ways. [66]

[65] *The expectation that during the first United Nations Development Decade the rich countries would contribute 1 percent of their GNP toward development assistance of the poor countries was not fulfilled. Most rich countries did not contribute more than 0.5 percent. Even this percentage decreased for some of the richest countries of the world continuously as the First Development Decade came to an end. For instance the USA contributed 0.53 percent of its GNP through Official Development Assistance in 1960. By 1973 this percentage has come down to 0.23 percent. See Robert S. McNamara. "Address to the Board of Governors", Washington D.C., September 1974, p. 27. In contrast with this, the contributions of OPEC countries seems to be rather generous. During 1974 four OPEC counrries, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates committed from 10 to 15 percent of their GNP to development assistance for the poor countries. See Edith Lenart, "Oil Producers Quick to Provide Help", Far Eastern Economic Review (January 31, 1975): 55-57.*

[66] *In this respect, Maurice Strong, Secretary General UN Conference on Human Environment has proposed: "This means a vast*

A full acceptance of the challenge of constructing a new global economic order in which a significant redistribution of wealth takes place in favour of the poor countries may require certain significant changes, apparently difficult to implement. Expecting that these changes would be initiated by the rich countries themselves, or by the rich classes in poor countries, would be utopian thinking. A major lesson to be drawn from the political development of Western countries should be applied in developing effective political strategies to create a new order. This lesson is that the political elite and the privileged economic classes only respond to the demands of the underprivileged when organised political pressure is generated from below by the less privileged classes. The application of this lesson in promoting international development would require more effective organisation on the part of the poorer countries, a more activist international role, and greater understanding of the mechanics of the international economic system. It would need manipulation of the economic levers to generate the effective redistribution of economic wealth rather than continue to rely upon the goodwill, altruism, and generosity of the rich countries. Most of all, it would require what the Third World Forum has called an "intellectual revolution", and intellectual self-reliance, in the Third World.

increase in the flow of resources between rich and poor countries, not merely on the basis of charity, but as a precondition to the kind of basic economic security which is essential to the health and stability of a functioning world system. And it will mean replacement of traditional development aid programmes with

more automatic and impersonal methods of transferring resources, such as use of special drawing rights and levies, tolls, or user charges on the use of global commons of oceans and atmosphere and possibly on the utilization of non-renewable resources."

APPENDIX

Introduction to a Debate

The question of which model or models of development would be relevant and effective in helping the less developed countries to breakthrough the vicious circle of underdevelopment has become more urgent and important because during the last decade, the models and strategies employed for this purpose have not produced the desired results. The issue was raised in the 1964 Conference on "Communication and Change in the Developing Areas", held at the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii, and produced an interesting debate, represented by two papers published in the volume resulting from the Conference. [67]

The controversy was provoked by Professor Lerner's remarks about the relevance of the Western model of development to developing countries and the ethnocentric predicament of Asian intellectuals in rejecting it. In his paper he argued as follows:

1).   That American interest in the development of less developed countries has been increasingly depoliticised, implying that American professional social scientists and intellectuals were not guided by political but by purely professional and objective considerations when they argued the case for the universal relevance and applicability of the Western model of development. This he contrasted with the politicisation of development

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[67] *See Danial Lerner "International Cooperation and Communication in National Development" and Inayatullah "Toward a Non-Western Model of Development", in Danial Lerner and Wilbur Schramni, eds. Communication and Change in Developing Countries, (Honolulu: East West Center Press, 1967). pp. 104-125, and pp. 98-120, respectively.*

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policy in Asian countries where public leaders have provoked and played upon anti-Western feelings to win popular support and to create an artificial unity, and where intellectuals lacking intellectual and personal freedom have shared the ethnocentric predicament of their public leaders.

2).   This ethnocentrism, he argued, was "not merely a self- indulgent nuisance but actually a major obstacle to development progress". [68] The Western model, which non-Western intellectuals and public leaders apparently rejected, incorporates certain values such as material welfare, power, rationality and skill which are universally desired. It exhibited "certain

components and sequences whose relevance is global". As demonstrated by Western experience, modernisation occurs when industrialisation, urbanisation, a rise in literacy and exposure to mass media occur in a particular sequence, raising popular participation in economic and political life. When this sequential process was distrubed by human choice, modernisation failed to occur.

Implicit in these observations was the suggestion that the range of choice with regard to the ultimate means and ends of modernisation was narrow. The sequential process of modernity, was historically determined and could be altered or tampered with only at one's peril. There was room for marginal adaptation and for the invention of "functional equivalents", but not for radical departures.

In sharp contrast with Professor Lerner's position I argued the following:

1). That Western social scientists involved in technical assistance programmes tend to adjust their perspectives to the political context of these programmes, and to

[68] Lerner, op. cit. p. 110.

prescribe solutions which are compatible with the global interest of their own countries. They also reflect ethnocentrism regarding the superiority of their culture and institutions. They exaggerate the relevance of the Western model of development for non-Western countries.

2). That the intellectual perspective of Western scholars on the development of societies is conditioned by a narrow and shaky unilinear view of the history of man which implies that societies at a lower level of development were inexorably bound to travel the same historical path through which the advanced industrial Western societies achieved their development.

3). That the relevance of the Western model to the conditions prevailing in non-Western countries should be critically examined rather than presumed, that non- Western societies should make a conscious and autonomous choice regarding the models of development they want to follow and that they should be inventive in developing new models of development. [69]

Developments during the last ten years have revealed several errors in my arguments, errors which are methodological and conceptual rather than substantive. These errors were first in suggesting a normative model of development which should be followed by non-Western countries rather than

[69] It's now apparent that Professor Lerner and I meant different things by 'Western model'. While I understood it to be a cultural and institutional complex, Professor Lemer meant by it increase in industrialisation and urbanisation, literacy, mass media and popular participation. (lbW, p. 114). Thus, by defining 'Western model' in this way, Professor Lerner could rightly claim universality for it. But apparently the conference on this issue was the victim of a serious gap in communication.

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specifying the extent of freedom available to them in choosing a model, and in assessing the probability of such non-Western model actually emerging. I also over-estimated the extent of freedom available to non-Western socieities, underestimating the constraints imposed by the historical evolution of these societies and their contemporary internal and external environments. Further, I used the blanket concept of a Western model, bundling together cultural and institutional aspects which created the wrong impression that everything Western was or should be suspect and that there was no room for selective adaptation.

Secondly, my failure to further explore the implications of the proposed non-Western model exposed it to the charge of being a superficial replica of the Western model. It could be legitimatley argued that the Western model was equally concerned with increasing control over nature, stressing self-determination and increasing the individual's self control.