

Failure of Democracy in Pakistan

Dr. Inayatullah

The main hypothesis of the study is that failure of democracy in Pakistan is failure of state and not of society. The state power is monopolised and exercised by civil bureaucracy and military. Having exclusive monopoly of coercive power, hierarchically organised, and with a culture that disposes military elite to intervene in politics, military has both motivation and capability to overthrow civilian governments. It has done it four times during last fifty four years of the life of the country. These interventions have done serious damage to the democratic process in Pakistan. Pakistani state continues to remain strong ruling over a society which has though sporadically resisted military rule over it yet due to these interventions it has not been able to evolve strong organisations to prevent repetition of cycle of military takeovers. After listing the strengths and weakness of democracy, quantitative evidence is listed for the main hypothesis.

A review of actions of the two state institutions provides evidence for the above hypothesis. Two military coups resulted in the abrogation of two out of the three constitutions promulgated. **The third constitution was kept in abeyance after coups of 1977 and 1999 by the leaders of the third and fourth military coups. Third coup maker revived it in 1985 in a mutilated form. In what form it will be revived now remains uncertain though all indications point out that it will become less democratic and less parliamentary .**

Repeated imposition of military rule and abrogation and radical amendment to the constitutions has snuffed out the culture of constitutionalism and rule of law from the culture that many ideologue of military consider responsible for failure of democracy. In contrast with politicians and civilian rulers who have occasionally violated spirit and form of constitution and rule of law the military coup end the constitutional framework which they ,

Consequently for about one third of its life the country remained under martial law and under the shadow of military for most of the remaining period. Out of 12 heads of state (Musharraf and not Tarar counted as effective head of state) of the country seven came from the military or bureaucracy. They stayed in power for 36 years, dismissed nine out of 16 regular Prime ministers, prematurely dissolved eight out of 11 elected national assemblies, and banned five out of seven political parties that were outlawed. They created or supported the establishment of four "King's parties." Fifth seems to in the making.

Fragile political system of Pakistan during last 52 years has experienced four total constitutional and political breakdowns and several partial ones reflected in abrogation of two constitutions (1956 and 1962), suspension of 1973 constitution twice and the imposition of emergencies eight times. These repeated breakdowns have led some to the conclusion that democracy in Pakistan have failed.

Several explanations of failure or weakening of democracy have been offered in official electronic media, newspaper columns and in academic writings. One set of explanations attribute this to prevalence of feudalism and corruption, greed, and incompetence of politicians. Another set of explanations ascribes it to low level of literacy in the country and lack of democratic political culture. Some extend this line of argument to contend that Western form of democracy does not suit the Muslim genius or failure of democracy is due to - Westminster model Pakistan adopted instead of presidential system more suited to its conditions. Still another explanation ascribes it to frequent military takeovers. These explanations become popular at different times depending on political environments when they are offered. After military takeover, the popular explanation is the prevalence of feudalism, low level of literacy and corruption of politicians. At this time the effect of military takeovers on democracy is ignored. Once a military ruler exhausts his initial, real or illusory, welcome and negative affects of military takeover on public life become apparent then focus of explanation is often the personality of the military ruler and sometimes the attributes of military as an institution. At this time the sins of politicians are forgotten.

The failure of democracy in Pakistan, assuming that it has failed, is not the failure of Pakistani society alone but primarily that of the state that has been expanding its power over it since the birth of the country. Pakistani society, with all its weaknesses, has made some democratic gains during last 52 years. First, in spite of frequent political breakdowns, commitment of political elite to democracy remains unchanged. Even when a military ruler overthrows a civilian ruler, he justifies his takeover with a promise to replace the previous "sham" democracy with a "real" one. No political party has rejected totally democracy though most political parties operate in an authoritarian way when in or out of power. Political parties and public has consistently rejected the idea of formalising a constitutional role for military. President Leghari's National Security Council was stillborn became moribund soon after it was established. Second, Pakistani society has not accepted an authoritarian ruler for long and has thrown up movements to challenge such rulers. Some significant national movements are anti-Ayub, anti-Bhutto and anti-Ziaul Haq.

Third, with all the interruptions and distortions it has suffered, the electoral process in the country particularly during last 14 years has changed the attitude of voters. A fewer number now vote under coercion or due to their economic and social dependence than earlier. The number of those who vote in exchange for gains for themselves and their community, for parties and programme and for particular political leaders is increasing. A new and somewhat democratic consciousness among disadvantaged groups such as lower rural and urban classes, minorities and women, is emerging though somewhat slowly. Fourth, a relatively free press that the authoritarian rulers have found hard to control or suppress is developing. A part of the press courageously monitors and reports the violation of democratic norms by state and powerful groups in the society. Fifth, changes in state and society and international environment have given rise to NGOs some of them fearlessly monitor the behaviour of state organs and challenge and resist undemocratic laws and rules. Finally, though share of lower and middle classes in representative institutions has not improved, a shift away from power of land-based rural

elite to urban business and industrial elite is occurring as reflected in the membership of National Assembly elected in 1997. Whether this change is definite gain for democracy is not yet clear. However, it can be argued that this change is weakening the hold of landed elite on politics.

Indeed these explanations are partly valid though they are seldom critically examined, rarely based on clear conceptualisation, and supported by rigorous scientific evidence. For instance the concept "feudalism" is used without making distinction between jagirdari (land grants) and zamindari (concentrated and large land ownership). The fact that law in 1952 in Punjab and NWFP abolished Jagirs is often ignored. Some important questions such as the extent of changes that have occurred in concentration of land ownership since the emergence of Pakistan until now, effect of Green revolution and mechanisation of agriculture on the political power of large land owners and its impact on the quality of politics and function of democracy are rarely studied. Urban-based intelligentsia considers its impressions on these issues good enough evidence to attribute failure of democracy to feudalism. Furthermore distinction between "feudal" land structure and feudal culture is seldom made and when it is made the significant elements of this culture are not identified nor the way they affect Pakistani politics is examined. Similarly literacy and political consciousness are usually equated and it is assumed that higher level of literacy and education automatically leads to democratic consciousness and political culture without much concrete evidence. In attributing the failure of democracy to absence of democratic culture in Pakistani society it is assumed that such a culture should pre-exist before democratic institutions are introduced. Only then they would functioning properly. But a people can learn a democratic culture only by operating a democratic system. An un-interrupted electoral process is far more effective way of imparting democratic political consciousness even among illiterate citizens. Literacy and education if suffused with anti-democratic contents cannot create such a consciousness. Similarly the explanation of failure of democracy due to military takeovers and personal traits of military rulers is not just to be asserted. Its impact on democracy need to be logically or empirically demonstrated.

All political systems are configured by distribution of power among different strata of society. When power becomes concentrated in one or few hands, one or a few institutions or classes, and there is no effective countervailing power an authoritarian system emerges. On the other hand when power is dispersed allowing direct or indirect participation of all citizens, it provides foundations on which democratic institutions can be built.

In Pakistan power is highly concentrated in small number of persons, classes and organisations. Those who control large organisations, wealth and property, and can effectively manipulate ideological symbols have more power than un-organised people, property-less classes, ethnic and religious minorities and women.

While all forms of concentration of power and imbalances in Pakistan have affected the development of democracy, it is the imbalance of power between state and society. That has primarily determined the fate of democracy. This overwhelming power of state is exercised by two state institutions - civil bureaucracy and military. Military, more specifically army, has the monopoly of coercive power superior to all other organisation which enables it to stage coups and direct the policies of the state when not in power. As will be discussed later, It is this strong tendency in military which has derailed the country from the path of democratic development. The weak political institutions of the state **such as legislatures and those organisations representing the society such as political parties, chamber of commerce and trade, unions of peasant and labour, and association of lawyers and journalists and other profession have been unable to constrain the army to its professional role.** The feudalism, lack of democratic culture and fragmented nature of Pakistani society are only passive conditions enabling the state institutions to actively expand their power or assert it whenever it starts shrinking. These conditions by themselves are not creating the crisis.

Historical Roots of Imbalance

The imbalance of power between state and society developed from the character of colonial state during British and earlier period of Indian history as the state was formed as a result of conquest and not from internal struggle of the Indian society itself. This alienation required that the state institutions, military and bureaucracy, be stronger, better organised and more "developed" to control the emerging organisations of civil society. Imbalance was strengthened as the colonial rule with the help of state institutions regulated the emergence of these organisations, monitored and supervised their activities, kept them weak, and often co-opted the compliant ones and suppressed the defiant ones. This depoliticized and atomised the Indian society.

The sequence and conditions in which the state institutions and organisations representing civil society emerged during British period also tilted the balance of power in favour of former. The state institutions were created in 18th century. The organisations representing society emerged only in first half of 20th century with a gap of more than a century. The latter developed very slowly facing resistance from state institutions particularly from civil bureaucracy. However, with internal dynamics of society and weakening of colonial rule, some autonomous organisations did emerge. They opened up limited space for democratisation of both state and society.

From their emergence in colonial period in 18th century, the elite of civil and military bureaucracies also developed a political culture - a set of attitudes that defined their relationship and governed their behavior towards politics and society which strengthen in military top brass the tendency to intervene in politics. This elite believed that it possessed superior rationality to define interest of state and society, greater patriotism and higher capacity to protect it than the politicians, intelligentsia and illiterate masses. In contrast to the image of politician as a corrupt person willing to bargain national interest for his self-

interest they perceived themselves incorruptible, honest and guardians of public interests, They defined their superior rationality in terms of order, stability, continuity, and security of state and "planned development" which they believed can be achieved if state has control over the society and its organisations. Their preferred way of organising society was to shape it in the image of their own hierarchical organisations, run and disciplined from a single center of power.

While both India and Pakistan inherited the same type of state institutions with similar political culture, India has been able to create an institutional balance between state and political institutions balance which Pakistan has yet to develop. This difference could be explained by the nature and style of political struggle led by Indian National Congress and All India Muslim League, their contrasting attitudes towards colonial state and its institutions and their divergent commitment to democracy. Congress in early twenties established direct contact with masses and combined its anti-colonial struggle with struggle for democracy. League on the other hand had limited contacts with the people particularly in areas that were to later constitute Pakistan and they were mediated through big landowners. It became a mass party only in mid-forties almost twenty-five years after Congress achieved this position. League's struggle was less directed against colonialism and more against Hindu domination. It was against the introduction of majoritarian democracy due to its fear that it would institutionalise permanent domination of Hindus over Muslim and seriously threaten their interests.

As a consequences of these difference the tendency among military and bureaucratic elite in India was contained by organisational power of Congress and other relatively development institutions. In Pakistan state institutions were able to retain their political culture. Their commitment to democracy remained as weak as it was during colonial period. In the absence of strong countervailing power of Muslim League they could easily intervene in politics further destabilising the balance of power. Other factors listed below also helped them.

The country was born in chaotic conditions creating a vacuum in which two state institutions expanded their role and power. The Muslim League - the Party that represented "potential" Pakistani society during heydays of Pakistan movement was not organised and powerful enough to control the state institutions. It was also intolerant of emergence of opposition parties and provincial autonomy. After its disintegration in early fifties, no other powerful national party emerged to exercise control over state institutions. Fragmented into sharp tribal, rural-urban, ethnic and religious divisions and shot with social and economic inequalities Pakistani society did not throw up strong organisations representing it. Politically pliant landed elite, the state dependent intelligentsia and tiny, weak and conservative middle class was unable to assert itself and become the axis of reversing the imbalance in favour of society. The fact that state institutions were manned predominantly by men belonging to religious and ethnic majority further compounded the imbalance.

The legacy of alienation between state and society of colonial period also remained intact in Pakistan as no overarching institutions which could serve as bridge between state and society emerged. Only when the survival of country was perceived to be under threat a temporary union developed between them as happened during 1965 war. However, once such a crisis was over, the state again reverted to its old pattern of controlling the society and alienation between the state and society resurfaced.

Evidence from data

This imbalance of power between state institutions particularly army and political organisations is evident from a set of data. Out of 11 Prime ministers elected by parliaments (excluding the four caretakers) four (Nazimuddin in 1953*) , Janejo (1988) Benazir Bhutto (in 1990) and Nawaz Sharif in (1993) were dismissed by a Governor General, a President cum COAS and a bureaucrat president with the support of military, Suhrawardy resigned under pressure from President Iskandar Mirza. Three (Noon, Z. A. Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in 1999) were removed through military coups. Only three (Bogra, Muhammad Ali, Chundrigar resigned Bogra in normal way due to lack of support in parliament. In no case Prime Minister or national assembly could remove or impeach a president. Only one president Ghulam Ishaq Khan was under the shadow of impeachment for awhile.

Out of ten elected National Assemblies eight were dissolved or suspended by head of the state with military or bureaucratic background. In turn only one civilian ruler could successfully remove a COAS (Gul Hassan) in 1972. Only one COAS resigned after he found that his criticism of the civilian government has raised a controversy. A civilian Prime Minister's attempt to dismiss a COAS in 1999 failed leading to removal and detention of PM.

Possessed by a sense of guardianship, heading a well organised and a powerful force, the COASs often clashed with their civilian bosses. Out of nine COAS only one, General Tikka Khan, had tension free relations with the prime ministers of the time. All others, Ayub Khan, Gul Hassan, Ziaul Haq, Beg, Asaf Nawaz, Kakar, Jahangir Karamat and Pervez Mushraf clashed with their civilian bosses. These clashes ended in dismissal of civilian bosses. Only Jehangir Karamat's case proved an exception.

Constitutionalism

Armed with superior coercive power the army top brass in Pakistan has become the ultimate determinant of who should exercise the state power and with what restrictions and not the constitution of the country that defines the role of different institutions and actors and set the limits on their use of power. This has aborted the development of constitutionalism, respect and inviolability of constitution and rule of law - elements that are essential for functioning of democracy. Pakistan's history is littered with demise and mutilation of several constitutions. Out of five constitutions drafted, three were

promulgated. Out of these three two, 1956 and 1962, were abrogated after military coups, The 1973 constitution has been held in abeyance twice by CMLAs. First time this constitution was held in abeyance, it was virtually inoperative. It ceased to have any force after Ziaul Haq introduced PCO of 1981. It was revived in 1985 in mutilated form. After 12th October coup it is again held in abeyance, though it remains in operation in certain areas.

Military rulers and Reconstion of Society and politiy

Every military ruler in Pakistan came with a new vision and diagnosis of ills of the society and started reshaping in the light of this vision. Ayub Khan wanted to modernise the state, impart political stability to it by replacing previous parliamentary system with his own version of presidential system and by restricting the adult franchise only to the first tier of Basic Democracies. He also created a highly centralised state retained One Unit which he had helped to impose on the country in mid fifties that denied the provinces their identity and control over their resources and strengthened the ethnic movements. It created serious controversies in the country. When Yahya Khan staged the coup he undid what Ayub Khan had done. Ziaul Haq had different vision compatible with his need for legimacy. He sought legitimacy in religion and using the instrument of state attempted to Islamise Pakistani society and state. His legacy continues to bifurcate the society on sharp lines. Military coups also opened up the issues which at earlier stage had been settled. Ayub Khan reopened the issues of form of government, the adult franchise settled in 1956 Constitution. Ziaul Haq reopened the issue of relation of state and religion by making the Objective Resolution a part of Constitution. In 1956 and 1962 Constitution it was only a preamble of the constitution. In spite of the effort of the three military rulers the state and society remain unchanged only more divided, less pious and more corrupt.

Judiciary and Military rule

Military takeover also damaged the independence of judiciary, an important pillar of democratic system. Civilian rulers particularly Z. A. Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were disrespectful toward judiciary. They tried to control it limit its powers. The worst attack on judiciary in its history was made during civilian rule when supporters of PM Nawaz Sharif attack and hounded out the chief justice of Pakistan. However, damage done to judiciary by military rulers is much more serious for several counts. The military rulers abrogated or suspended constitutions undermining constitutional foundation of judiciary. Military rulers asked judges to take fresh oath under the PCOs (1981 and 2000) introduced by them. Fresh oath was meant to ensure that judiciary was no longer to take decision in the framework of constitution but according the wishes of the military rulers. In administering fresh oath the military rulers ensured that judges unsympathetic to their takeover were not invited. The vacancies thus created were filled with judges who they expected would support military rule. Gen. Ziaul Haq dissolved some Judicial benches apprehending that they were going to give judgements against his wishes. COAS Aslam Beg according to his own confession sent a message to the supreme Court not to

restore government of Junejo and assemblies elected in 1985. The judgement of the Court was consistent with his wishes.

Political Parties

After takeover the military ruler often tried to liquidate political parties that they considered were a threat to their power. Awami League in 1958, PPP in 1977 and PML in 1999 were the target of military rulers. They split these parties, co-opted their splinter groups willing to support their political agenda. Muslim League was splitted in mid fifties to create Republican party by Iskandar Mirza. Ayub Khan created Convention Muslim League, Ziaul Haq and later Ghulam Ishaq Khan attempted to divide Peoples Party. Military rulers sometimes created client political parties and sponsored alliances as the case with IJI to counter the power of parties not subservient to them. Even the client parties were kept in competition with each other for gaining access to state patronage, lest any one of them became an indispensable ally and could challenge the military rule. This stunted the growth of political parties . They could not take roots in the people, became ethnicised and opportunistic. Lotocracy flourished. Party discipline and loyalty suffered.

Electoral process

Continuity of electoral process in a political system ensures accountability of politicians, imparts to the citizens a sense of participation in state affairs develop a stake in them and learn or acquire democratic culture. This continuity was aborted several time by both civilian and military rulers but with a difference. Some civilian rulers rigged elections as it happened in 1950's and 1977. But they did not stop the electoral process nor did they change it. Military rulers on the other hand three times aborted this process in 1958, 1977, and then in 1999. Supported by C-in-C bureaucrat Governor General dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 1954 which had prepared the draft of the constitution. Had the Assembly been not dissolved elections were to follow.

Ayub Khan changed the electoral system from direct to indirect franchise when he introduced the Basic Democracies depriving the citizens to directly elect president and assemblies. He promulgated a new constitution in 1962 followed by a partyless indirect elections held during martial law. To remain in power during the 1964-65 elections President got the 1962 constitution amended. This power helped him to get elected in his presidential elections of 1965. The elections of 1970 held after second military takeover were comparatively fair, though the regime attempted to produce desirable election result by financing certain political parties. After the third military takeover in 1977, the elections promised by Gen. Ziaul Haq were not held. When they were held political parties did not participate as their demand that for fair elections martial law must be lifted was not met.

To gain political and constitutional legitimacy two military rulers Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq held referendums under martial law when political parties were banned. Ayub Khan was

elected president by votes of 96% of Basic Democrats. Ziaul Haq claimed 62% votes. However, in spite of pressure from his regime actually he did not get more than 10% of the votes. Thus military rules destroyed the electoral process.

Civic Competence

The coups and military rule in Pakistan weakened the civic competence in citizens in several ways. It deprived them the opportunity to remove or de-elect the politician they thought betrayed their mandate. As the coup became more frequent, a section of citizens and some politicians became dependent on military to overthrow the civilian rulers rather than exerting themselves to remove them through election or through popular movements.

Politicians

Military elite, when not directly ruling the country, started sometimes subtly and sometimes not so subtly manipulating the political process. Some of them got a government dismissed that they did not like. Some engineered alliances and manipulated elections to prevent the return of disliked party. Some supported and brought to political power politicians to be later overthrown in a coup. The consequence of it was that elected politicians could not learn from their mistakes, implement their party manifesto. Unsure of their future and loss of face with the voters some of them engaged in political and financial corruption.

Policy making

The imbalance of power has also expanded the policy making role of civil and military bureaucracies. When military is ruling the country, it totally determines all the state policies. But even when it is not directly ruling it controls the formulation of policy vital to its interests such as security policy including nuclear policy, and relation with certain countries. Overwhelming power of military enabled military leaders to indirectly or directly intervene in politics. They staged coups when they thought that politicians were violating the norms of rationality and morality they have prescribed for them. This retarded the development of democracy in several ways.

Role of Military During Civilian Interlude

The imbalance of power has also expanded the policy making role of civil and military bureaucracies. Overwhelming power of military enabled military leaders to indirectly or directly intervene in politics. **They staged coups when they thought that politicians were violating the norms of rationality and morality they have prescribed for them. This retarded the development of democracy in several ways. First, coups deprived the**

Pakistani citizens the right to remove or de-elect the governments they elected. Second, rather than removing them through election or through popular movements some citizens and politicians became dependent on military to overthrow the civilian rulers they did not like. Third, military elite, when not directly ruling the country, manipulated the political process sometimes subtly and sometimes not so subtly. During the last 11 years of civilian rule one army chief who had also assumed the office of president dismissed his handpicked Prime Minister. His successor advised the Supreme Court not to restore the assembly that had elected the dismissed PM. The same chief also got the government elected in 1988 elections dismissed through the president. He also openly participated in electoral process by providing funds to the opponents of the party of dismissed government and issued statements urging people not to vote for it. One head of ISI engineered an alliance before 1988 elections to defeat a political party. Some army chiefs and head of intelligence agencies patronised a politician who later became Prime Minister two times.

During the interlude of civilian rules when the state institutions shared power on certain issues with politicians it was on terms set by them even with civilians of their own choice keeping a sharp eye on their behaviour. Ayub Khan supported Ghulam action against Khwaja Nazimuddin. Ziaul Haq punished Junejo besides other reasons, because he signed Geneva Accord. Benazir has to agree to a deal limiting her power before she could be inducted as PM. Beg Issued statement against the policy of government on Gulf war. President refuse to dismiss him when the PM wanted to punish him for defiance of government policy. Asaf Janjua engaged in politics when he opened negotiations with opposition leader. Kakar pressured Nawaz Sharif to resign. Jahangir Karamat issued public statement against the government that as public servant he was not supposed to do. Kargil operation was initiated without clear approval of the PM.

The military-bureaucratic state of Pakistan, by its very nature, is simultaneously centralised and centralizing. It is centralised due to its imperial feudal and colonial structural heritage, its authoritarian nature, and its anti-political culture and dependent character. A colonial state can persist only if there are only a few centers of political decision making, the decisions made are effectively carried out and not questioned and no autonomous centers of power capable of challenging the validity of these decisions exist or develop. To achieve this, the colonial state developed two interdependent institutions - military and bureaucracy. Both were highly centralised. The bureaucracy, particularly, extended itself to all corners of the colonial empire and developed into an effective mechanism of control of a large population from four levels of organisations - metropolitan, the imperial capital, provincial capitals and district headquarters. All levels were hierarchically organised and ultimately controlled from a single center. Paradoxically, this centralised system had also developed a certain degree of decentralization, but not to transfer power to the ruled only for exercising effective control over them through district officials who, in the days of primitive means of communication, could not always consult their superiors quickly for effectively dealing with a crisis or an emergency. The district official, through training at an early stage of his career, his full commitment to his colonial

obligations, and his sense of insecurity in an alien and occasionally hostile society, ensured that he would take decisions exactly as his superior wanted him to take.

The Pakistani state having become stronger than the society, and lacking support and roots in it, has remained a dependent state, more or less on the colonial pattern. When the colonial rulers left, it maneuvered to find a new patron - the USA - fitting itself into its political designs and plans, which provided it necessary resources to maintain its authoritarian character. Indeed, in the time of crisis, when its international political patrons found it irrelevant to their designs or it has shown a degree of autonomy from them on a certain issue, the patron has sought to punish it. On such occasions the Pakistani society has experienced a degree of nationalism and a temporary union developed between the state and society as during 1965 war. However, once such a crisis was over, the state again reverted to its old pattern of dependence. The nationalist feelings in the society subsided. Alienation between the state and society reemerged. The dependent relations got further fortified. This is where the Pakistani state and society find themselves today. Suffocating in the straitjacket of dependency, the state invokes nationalist feelings. But having done it too many a time and given false calls, the society is unwilling to be duped again. The call goes unresponded.

As the colonial state extended, the scope of its activities and intervention in the Indian society, it became a vehicle of centralizing the society. The imperial bureaucracy took some of the decision once taken in remote hamlets of the empire, gradually. The traditional self-sufficiency and autonomy of the colonised society eroded more and more.

In the post-colonial situation, both the centralised structure of bureaucracy and its centralizing drive, instead of weakening, got further strengthened. Some of the reasons for this may be mentioned: the failure to develop a democratic alternative, weakening of the political party which spearheaded the Pakistan movement, lack of a new and democratic vision of society, chaotic conditions in which independence came, fear of re-absorption and sense of insecurity in relation to the neighbouring state from which Pakistan was partitioned, and the drive to create and impose the authority of a new center, on the part of the migrating leadership on the provinces which became converts to the idea of the new state of Pakistan just a few years before its creation.

These conditions favoured the further strengthening of the military-bureaucratic state in Pakistan. The weak society and its political organisations could not direct or regulate the development of this state. With frequent coups and military rule, the state became more centralised. Provincial governments further weakened. Whatever pseudo-decentralization existed at the district level also started eroding. Religion was pressed into the service of the state, to legitimise its authoritarian and centralised character. Unity, faith, discipline rather than dissent, tolerance and democratic participation became the state slogans.

Like other post-colonial states of the Third World, the Pakistani state has maintained its colonial character with minor adjustments after independence. However, unlike their Indonesian and Turkish counterparts, Pakistani military and bureaucratic institutions, though exercised power in the most part of country's history directly. Their de facto power has not been formally institutionalised and legitimised. The military coups or rules have been justified as temporary short term extra-constitutional but not in terms of any moral principle or political doctrine.

With military coup of 12th October, Pakistani state has reverted to its dominant form of a pure military-bureaucratic state (MBS) with two state institutions military and civil bureaucracy directly or indirectly controlling the state policy. This is the form, it assumed during 1958-1962, 1968 - 1972 and from 1977 to 1985. Limited change it experienced under civilian or semi-civilian rule during 1962-1968, 1972- 1977, and 1985-99 proved a transitory phenomenon - providing a democratic mask to MBS. To understand why MBS has persisted in Pakistan and why democratic deviations has proved so short lived and rootless one need first to comprehend the existence of persistent imbalance of power between Pakistani state and society and some basic and enduring characteristics of MBS.

The share of the two institutions in state power has changed at different times, as does the pattern of their relationship from cooperation and alliance to conflict and antagonism, from domination of one at one time to subordination of the same at another. However, equipped with coercive power military has remained the dominant partner most of the times. Since the resignation of bureaucrat president in 1993 from his office, the share of bureaucracy in strategic decision making has considerably declined. These internal shifts in power, however, have not affected the overall power of state institutions vis-a-vis society.

But a society, any society, due to many conflicts embedded in it cannot easily be organised fitting into military-bureaucratic pattern. Politicians, some of them corrupt, are indispensable as they play a significant role in resolving these conflicts. The electoral process keeps them in touch with problems of the people that they articulate at different levels of government. Under pressure from contradictory demands of different powerful political groups they build coalitions and engineer compromises and thus keep the system at manageable level of conflict. The military bureaucratic elite finds this process irrational - a negation of discipline and orderly conduct of affairs.

Thus there is an inherent conflict between the structures and processes of politics, particularly democratic one, and functioning and persistence of democracy in Pakistan and the concentration of power in the two state institutions and their anti-politics culture. They inevitably collide with each other.

. which is heavily tilted in favour of two state institutions - military and civil bureaucracy. The share of military particularly the army has been the largest followed by the civil bureaucracy. This institutional imbalance is the

First military-bureaucratic elite has often engineered the constitutional breakdowns. A bureaucrat Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad with the consent of military elite dissolved the first Constituent Assembly when it had passed the draft of a constitution, and imposed an emergency on the country disregarding constitutional limitations on his power. This Governor General was turned out of office by another bureaucrat - Iskandar Mirza - who assumed the office of president under the 1956 Constitution through political machination and with the support of military establishment. Mirza and Ayub Khan, the military chief, together, imposed first nation-wide martial law, abrogated the constitution and aborted the scheduled elections of 1959.