
Democracy in Rural Communities in Pakistan

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Gegen diese fortlaufend wachsenden Wohngemeinden haben sich seitens der eingesessenen Stadtbevölkerung rassische und kulturelle Vorurteile ausgebildet. Daher vollzieht sich der Umstellungsprozeß der Zugewanderten oft in einer ihnen feindlichen Atmosphäre.

Eine wesentliche Hilfe bieten die sozialen Klubs, die sich im Zusammenhang mit den überall im Lande verbreiteten Klubs in Lima entwickelt haben. Hier treffen die Zugewanderten ihre Landsleute, die ihnen durch Beispiel und Beistand das Eindringen in die großstädtische Lebens- und Arbeitsweise erleichtern. Gleichzeitig wird das traditionelle Brauchtum gepflegt und ein gewisser Ersatz geschaffen für die hergebrachten Bindungen an Verwandtschaftsgruppen und ihre Funktionen. Schließlich tragen die Klubmitglieder auch geschäftliche Fragen und Wünsche ihrer Heimatgemeinden an die Regierungsstellen in Lima heran. Auf diese Weise vertiefen sich die Wechselwirkungen zwischen den Gemeinden draußen im Lande und den Mitgliedern der verschiedenen Klubs. Andererseits reflektieren die Klubs die sozialen und rassischen Vorurteile, die persönlichen und familialen Animositäten ihrer Mitglieder. Im Ganzen aber sind die Klubs Stätten des Zusammenhaltes, zumal unwillige Mitglieder jederzeit ausscheiden und anderen Klubs in Lima beitreten können. Abschließend wird der Verlauf einer Zusammenkunft in einem der Klubs geschildert.

Democracy in Rural Communities in Pakistan

By Inayat Ullah

I.

The Punjabi villager voted for the first time in his history in 1951 on the basis of adult franchise, to elect the members of the Provincial Assembly. Before this there had prevailed the rule of Limited Franchise, according to which only literate and landowning people could vote. This was a new and novel experience for the farmer. He had no parallel of it in his past nor had he learned anything about it from his ancestors.

This was a responsibility too, but his knowledge of the nature and functions of modern democratic Government and its process of formation and change was too poor to enable him to take it as a duty and realize the grave consequences to which his failure to discharge it properly might lead. Moreover the socio-economic structure of his society which inalienably linked the individual to the decision of various groups and gave the patriarch an unlimited control over the members of the family, and which through economic and social control gave extensive power to the *Zamindar* over tenants and *Kammi*, was

* The special terms used in this article are explained in the author's earlier article in *Sociologist*, vol. 8, 1958, p. 170—186.

not accommodative to an institution whose proper functioning required the freedom of the individual from various pressures and at least a minimum of education and moral responsibility. Democracy was here on alien lands.

To understand the forces which influence the behaviour of an individual in an election, the social and economic structure of the village as well as the different links that integrate it with other villages are to be fully comprehended.

II.

The first important fact about the village life is that it is not an aggregate of individuals. In fact, the real individual in the sense of Western urban society does not exist in the village. He is an inalienable part of multiple groups which completely overshadow his individuality. He is not master of his own will and architect of his own fate. The various decisions in different fields of life are made by groups for him and he rarely feels the need to challenge them. Conflict may arise from claims of different groups on him, but such conflict rarely becomes intra-personal as he needs no rationalization of his behavior in ethical and political phraseology. Invincibility of the strongest pull is a sufficient explanation.

Family: The first and most important group for the individual is the family which makes for him the major decisions in life. The eldest in the family decides, in the light of custom and tradition, what profession one should adopt, how much education one should receive, whom one should marry and what type of inter-personal relations one should maintain.

Baradari: Next to the family comes the Baradari group. For a landowning family the Baradari means all the families in the village which descend from an immediate common ancestor; for a Kammi family, it means all the families in the village that belong to the same profession. The Baradari protects the family from every assault and shares with it its joys and sorrows. But as there is competition for supremacy and discord over division of property, the internal unity of it is not very strong.

Caste Group: Next to Baradaris comes the caste group which is a confederation of several Baradaris in different villages having a common ancestor several generations up. Caste considerations are important at the occasion of selection of a mate, and it has sentimental value too. The family, Baradari and caste group are parallel groups and there is rarely any conflict among their claims upon the individual.

Zamindar and Kammi: The rural population is divided into the two broad categories of Zamindar and Kammi, except for a few cases that

do not belong to either. All those families that own land, or if they do not own land, are known to have owned land some generations ago, and do not practice a Kammi profession are Zamindars. All the non-agriculturist families which are doing the profession of a Kammi like shoe-making, shaving etc., are Kammi.

As the Kammi do not own land, and as even the plots on which they erect their cottages belong to the Zamindar, while they work for the Zamindar families for six-monthly wages, they have to follow the line suggested by Zamindars in intra-village and intervillage affairs. Usually a Kammi sides with the Zamindar with whom he is attached through *saip* ties. Some Zamindars have no land and others have surplus land. As land is relatively scarce, and other jobs neither easily available nor adoptable, a tenant could adopt an independent policy only at the cost of ejection from land. Thus, within the village the individual is first under the strong control of family and Baradari, and if he is not a landowner he faces economic sanctions against his independence.

A village is not a self-sufficient, isolated abode of man. It is integrated with other villages into a complex network of relationships. Three ties are most important: — (1) Kinship ties. (2) Caste ties. (3) Factional affiliation.

Kinship ties link a family to several villages at various distances. Take two families who were linked for one or more generations. They devotedly take interest in the welfare of each other and consult each other in important family affairs. The kinsmen come to the help of a family in economic troubles and sometimes support it in internal strifes. Therefore, a family invariably takes into consideration the advice offered in intervillage affairs.

In the village the Baradari is a rival of this group. When the Baradari is strong and there is no dynamic and influential leader in the kinship group, the Baradari wins the adherence of the family; on the other hand, when the Baradari is weak, kinship ties out-do it in strength. If a family practices endogamous marriage, automatically kinship and caste groups coincide, which otherwise may run across each other. The Baradari and caste group are generally parallel, as the caste group is an extension of the Baradari in other villages.

Factional affiliation: The need for factional affiliation arises due to tension within the village, ignorance of the law and legal procedures of the villagers and arbitrary powers of the police. In all these situations, a family needs the help of a person who has influence with the police, knows the law and legal procedures, and has effective friendship all around. Such a person is usually a big landlord who could spare the time for such activities. In an area there can be

one or several such leaders, and they may have links among themselves.

A family could have either direct contact with a "leader" or through some relatives or through the village headman. On the other hand, these "leaders" try to align themselves with another leader on a higher level of influence and gradually the link touches the political party in power. Thus factional affiliations ultimately connect the village to one or more political parties, the main links being the local village leader, the territorial leader, the semi-political leader, and on the top the political party. The factional affiliations are growing gradually, especially as the isolation and social and economic self-sufficiency of the village is breaking down.

There is a possibility of conflict in the interests of Baradari and caste if the territorial leader does not belong to these groups; but if he belongs to it, his position in the village is further strengthened.

Such is the web of socio-economic relationships in the village.

III.

The village Bavera under our study, has 44 families of which 19 belong to agricultural castes and 22 are *Kammi*, one Syed and 2 *Mian Ji*. The 19 Zamindar families are divided into four Baradaris. The *Bavera* Baradari has three units with five families. This Baradari has their common ancestor four generations up. The three units are inter-linked by marital ties, but due to quarrels among the women on distribution of common water they now have not very amicable relations. Half of the cultivated area in the village belongs to the *Bavera* Baradari. The first two units, each with two families, have land just sufficient for their livelihood, but as the three leaders of the village are from these two units, they are quite influential. The third unit with one family is headed by a widow. The family had enough land to spare and has four families of tenants among the *Kammis*. The *Lambardar* (Headman) of the village belongs to this Baradari and the responsibility to finance the entertainment of common guests of the village rests with it.

The second Baradari is of *Virks* who were previously tenants but had recently bought land from the next village. They take less interest in village affairs. This Baradari consists of 4 families. The third Baradari is of *Tarars* with two families. The two families have nothing in common except the caste name. They own land just sufficient for their living. The head of one family is member of the village *pareh*.

The *Gujjar* Baradari consists of four families who are refugees from India, had no marital ties among themselves, nor with any other family in the village. They have been allotted land which is just


sufficient for their living. Some of the members of this group have been in the second World War and are interested in country politics.

These four Baradaris are independent units having no marital ties. They have no history of feuds and factions, except some occasional minor disputes which have rarely become a permanent problem.

All the Kammi are considered a Baradari, though each profession individually is one Baradari. As the social and economic position of the Kammi is weak, therefore they usually take their cue from the four main Baradaris.

As the village is small, each Baradari cannot have a separate set of Kammi. All the Kammi are Kammi of the whole village. But as the social and economic position of the Bavera Baradari is comparatively great, it had more hold on the Kammi. There are no strong feelings of village unity and neither any sharp schism in it. There is no tight control over Kammi as is characteristic of Tarar villages. The village is known for its peaceful life.

Kinship ties of Bavera village: As discussed above, kinship ties are the most important connections between two families and thereby between two villages. These relations make the people of the two villages acquainted with each other. The relationship is not only limited to the family concerned, but through them the other families too get intimate. B 1 F 1, one family from one unit of the Bavera family, has kinship relations with a Tarar family (see diagram p. 41) in the village *Mehdiabad*. The relationship is several generations old and in this way the whole Bavera Baradari is indirectly connected with it. In fact most of the villagers of Bavera are acquainted with the residents of *Mehdiabad* and at "sad and joyous" occasions many people from each village would exchange visits. As the family is a territorial leader of the area, the other Baradaris which are not related to it through kinship, have factional affiliations with it. Family B 1 F 1 has other kinship ties in one *chotta* family (N) in a village 10 miles away. The relationship is a new one, but as the head of N is active in village affairs, some villagers expect help from him. The other kinship ties are not important for our study. B 1 F 2 has its important kinship ties in a nearby village of 2 miles distance. As the ties are very close and the family concerned is active in village politics, B 1 F 2 always seeks guidance from it in all important problems. B 2 F 1 have their oldest kinship ties with S in *Mehdiabad*. The family is headed by a widow who wanted to remarry in S. But as there was no encouraging response from S, relations became strained. Later it was suspected that the widow has had a hand in a plot to murder one member of S. Since then the kinship has turned into enmity. Now usually B 2 F 1 follows a negative policy towards S. The next kinship



ties of the family are in a *Tarar* village of 4 miles distance. The two families had not very good relations, but since B 2 F 1 and S have become enemies, the old relationships were revived. The third set of relatives are in *Bavera* village but these are not important for either family.

B 3 F 1 had its important kinship relations with B 1 F 1, B 1 F 2, B 2 F 1 within the village and with a *Jag* family in another village at 12 miles distance. As kinship in the village were weakened by *Sharika* (rivalry) feelings, the ties with the *Jag* family have become stronger. B 3 F 2 have its important kinship relation in nearby *Hajra* village. As this family is a "leader" family too, B 3 B 2 is always under the sway of it. The *Tarar* family TF 1 had its kinship ties in a village at 10 miles, and further ties at 2 miles distance. TF 2 had only one important kin in a village at 1 mile distance and most of the decisions of the family are made by these kins.

The two *Baradaris* *Gujjar* and *Virk* have no kinship ties.

Factional Affiliations: There is no centralised leadership in the village; in *Bavera* the *Bavera Baradari* vests the local leadership. Through them contacts are established with territorial leaders. For most of the families of this *Baradari*, S in *Mehdiabad* is the leader. The *Virk* and *Gujjar Baradari*, too, accept the hegemony of this family. Only B 3 F 2, B 2 F 1 and TF 1 have their factional leaders elsewhere. B 1 F 1 is attached to two factions. The *Kammi* ordinarily recognize the territorial leadership of S.

IV.

Village *Bavera* is one of several villages of the *Bavera Caste*. The *Bavera* caste is known for its simplicity, shyness, submissiveness and passivity. Most of them are illiterate and lack dynamic leadership in the community. The local administration is very weak and the ranking system is not as tight as in the neighbouring *Tarar* community. The *Bavera* caste is a sub-caste of *Hajra* caste which is further a sub-caste of *Jats*. The difference between caste and sub-caste is nominal, at least in this case, and no significance is attached to the difference. The groups' temperament, economic and social organisation are not much different.

To the west, south-west and north-west of *Bavera* spreads the *Tarar* caste. Some of the *Tarar* are very big *Jagidars*. They are more educated and have been in the arena of local and national politics from the beginning of this century on. One of them has been a member of the council of states in 1942 in the Central Government of India. Some *Tarars* hold very important posts in the civil and military administration. All important public offices of the area are held by

them. They consider themselves as the leaders of the area and contemptuously call the Bavera as "sheep". There are three important villages of Tarars: Kolo, Rasulpur and Vanika. The more educated and rich live in these villages, while the other Tarar live in smaller villages of the area. The dwellers of these smaller villagers are divided between the leadership of these three villages. Beyond the Tarars in the south-west spread the Bhattis, a sub-caste of the Rajputs. They are close to the Tarar in many respects and are as educated and influential as the Tarar. As the Bhattis practice endogamous marriages, they have become an isolated group.

In the north and north east lies the Chatta Caste — a sub-caste of Jats. The Chattas are closer to the Baveras in group temperament than to Tarar and Bhattis. Not many of them are educated and the few who are, either stay in the village or hold ordinary jobs in cities. Chattas have no custom to prohibit them from concluding exogamous marriage. They intermarry with Baveras and Tarars.

V.

The constituency demarcated for provincial elections of 1951 combined the police station Vanika Tarar and Jalalpur. This demarcation included the majority of Tarars, Chattas and Baveras, while a major portion of Bhattis went to an other constituency. As the Bavaras consider themselves a part of the Hajra caste, most villages of which fell in another constituency, they felt that they were dismembered and could not muster a majority in the election.

One Tarar R from Rasulpur and Tarar A from Kollo applied for the Muslim League party ticket — i. e. the party which was in power in the center as well as the provinces at that time and was popular with the people because of the creation of Pakistan. R was an old leaguer and had relatives in the Parliamentary Board appointed for distributing party tickets. The other applicant A joined the Muslim League after Partition. He was indirectly related to the then President of the provincial Muslim League. It was a strong contest.

The Parliamentary Board demanded an oath of allegiance to the decisions of it by the applicants. Both the candidates took the oath upon the Holy Book (Quran) publicly. The ticket was given to R. A violated the oath and decided to contest the elections independently. The third candidate was put up by the Azad Pakistan party, a pro-left party recently organised. He was a Chatta teacher. As the candidate did not consult his caste group on this problem and depended more on the party, the caste group did not show much enthusiasm for him.

The Baveras were ambitious to put up their own candidate. They called a meeting of the community in which also some Hajra parti-

ipated. But as several members proposed were not willing to contest the elections due to lack of funds and the strength of the community did not ensure a safe victory, the idea of putting up a Bavera candidate was dropped. At this occasion S, the independent candidate, joined the meeting and proposed that if the Bavera community supported him, he would be helping them in the next election of the District Board. The Baveras agreed and the meeting ended. All the candidates have three fronts. The first was publicity and propaganda. The loudspeakers were fitted into jeeps and the announcer would visit every village and speak in favor of their candidate. The Muslim League candidate supporters dilated upon the achievements of their party, like the creation of Pakistan and the conference of the right of ownership of property to the women. The independent candidate first spoke against the inefficiency of the League candidate and his apathetic and arrogant attitude towards the common man. In some villages they would take the Quran with them and say, that if their candidate came into power they would establish Islamic order in the society.

The Azad Pakistan party's main theme was the transference of ownership of land to tenants and removal of poverty and economic inequality.

The second front was the pressure upon the voters through Baradari, caste kinship and factional ties. The candidates had entrusted the territorial leaders in their support with this job, supervising it personally. The territorial leaders would find out all possible relations connecting a family and would find ways and means to influence the voters. Most of the vote gained by a candidate came under this pressure, while the results of the publicity were nil.

The third front and the *ultima ratio* of the candidate was the *Mela*. The candidate would take his sister or daughter to the house of an influential member of the community to request for the vote of the community. This would be called the Mela of daughter or sister. The candidate may take the *Mela* of the Pir of a family. The Pir would either go to the family himself or would write a letter to the family. The Mela technique is rarely ineffective.

The independent candidate had an old enmity with his uncle who had killed his brother. He told him that he could forgo the revenge if he (the uncle) supported him. The uncle agreed.

In some villages the voters received money too. But this was regarded ignoble by the villagers. Money usually is not paid directly for votes. The candidate would give money to a family and say that this was for the expenditure they would make on his behalf for serving the voters.

The Bavera community had decided in favour of A. But firstly this decision was more in the nature of an advice than a mandate. Secondly it was obligatory only for the Bavera Baradari. The Gujjar, Tarar and Virk Baradari could make their own policy.

All Gujjars and Virk recognised the leadership of the S family in Mehdiabad and S was in favour of A due to kinship, caste and faction pressure, therefore Gujjar and Virk voted for A. The TF 1 had decided to vote for A in compliance with the wishes of the Bavera Baradari. But a few days before polling, its kins from the Chatta village who were under the influence of a territorial leader supporting R came and changed its first opinion. It finally voted for R. TF 2 voted for A as his candidate; besides support of Bavera was receiving the support of his one kinsman.

The B 1 and B 3 units of the Bavera, decided to vote for A, both in compliance with community mandate and the wishes of the territorial leader, S of Mehdiabad. B 2 decided to vote against A, as he was being supported by S, its enemy. Later, when kinsmen of the family asked to vote for R, it had further reason to vote for R.

A few days before the elections the Chatta kinsman of B 1 F 1 came to get votes for R, to whom he was related by marital ties. B 1 F 1 was under the stress of two opposing pulls. Finally, half of the family voted for S and half for R, B 1 F 2 voted for A, the candidate of S, as its caste mandate, factional affiliations and kinship ties all supported him.

B 3 F 1 voted for A as asked by S and further strengthened by caste mandate. However *Jag* kinsmen pulled him for R. Later, when B 3 F 1 visited these kinsmen, there was a lot of trouble for him.

B 3 F 2 voted for R in defiance of community mandate and according to the wishes of its territorial leader in another village. Moreover, he wanted to oblige the N kinsman of B 1 F 1. As all the tenants were attached to B 3 F 1, they all voted for the candidate of their landlord. The Kammi were divided by the supporters of two candidates. In case a Kammi family was asked by supporters of both leaders, it gave half of its votes to one and half to the other. The difficulty for the Kammi arose when both parties wanted all the votes of it. In such cases a few families were threatened by the Zamindars.

The third Chatta candidate received no vote from this village. A member of B 1 F 1 who was studying in a college and sympathised with the program of the party wrote his family to vote for him. But as the other pulls on the family were stronger, they did not vote for him.

The attached graphs indicate the different pulls working on the voter and the division of village Bavera over the elections.

Democracy can function successfully only, if the voter is aware of the consequences his choice of candidate would lead to, and if he is free from economic and social pressures that can compel him to vote for a candidate he does not like to elect. The third prerequisite is that he is conscious of unity of social progress and is enlightened enough to place the interests of nation and mankind above all.

All these prerequisites are not present even in well-established and advanced democracies. But they are almost completely absent from the under-developed rural population of Asia. Though their societies on the whole have set themselves on the path of democracy, their cultural and economic set-up lag far behind these ideals.

As our above data show, the political party concerned was not a homogeneous unit of people aspiring for the pursuit of a particular program, but rather a conglomeration of families linked by caste, kinship and factional affiliations, with a desire to gain power in the name of the party. When the party did not give the ticket to one member, he contested election against his party. When successful, he was admitted as the member of the party just to swell its ranks. No party had any following in the area and in most cases the voters did not know the name of the party, not to speak of its program.

Both the candidates did not approach the voters directly. Neither did they attempt to enlist their support with a program to improve the condition of the voters; on the other hand, they exploited the attachment and dependence of the individual over different groups. While voting for any particular candidate, the voter did not care of the moral status or efficiency of the candidate but voted for the strongest pressure. This sometimes led to a split in the caste, kinship and Baradari groups and sometimes created very embarrassing situations for the down-trodden group of Kammiss.

Synopsis

Demokratie in ländlichen Gemeinden in Pakistan

In den Dörfern des *Punjab* wurde 1951 zum ersten Male in ihrer Geschichte auf Grund des allgemeinen Wahlrechts zur Provinzialversammlung gewählt. Für die meisten Stimmberechtigten fehlte dem Wahlakt jeder traditionelle Hintergrund, die Kenntnis vom Funktionieren der modernen Demokratie war sehr gering ausgebildet, und das Bewußtsein der mit der Stimmabgabe verbundenen Verantwortung fehlte weitgehend. Andererseits band der sozialökonomische Aufbau der Gesellschaft den einzelnen an die Entscheidung verschiedener Gruppen, so daß eine unabhängige Wahl kaum getroffen werden konnte. — Um das Verhalten des

einzelnen Wählers verständlich zu machen, werden die einzelnen Gruppen und sozialen Kategorien geschildert, denen das Individuum gleichzeitig angehört und zwischen deren verschiedenen Ansprüchen durchaus Konflikte auftreten können. Die abstrakte Aufzählung dieser Faktoren wird ergänzt durch das Bild ihrer realen Gestaltung in dem Dorf *Bavera* und seiner Nachbarschaft, die teilweise mit *Bavera* zu einem Wahlkreis zusammengefaßt worden war. Anschließend wird der Verlauf der Kandidatenaufstellung und des Wahlkampfes auf der Grundlage der genannten sozialen Gruppierungen analysiert.

Rauschinduzierende Mittel bei Naturvölkern und ihre individuelle und soziale Wirkung

Von Ursula Knoll-Greiling

I.

Während in früheren Arbeiten über den Schamanismus bzw. die Medizinleute bei Naturvölkern die Rauschzustände (Trance, Ekstase) der Schamanen häufig als Absonderlichkeiten oder pathologische Zustände angesehen wurden (z. B. Ohlmarks¹, Zucker²), neigt man neuerdings zu der Auffassung (Greiling^{3/4}, Eliade⁵, Metraux⁶, Webster⁷), daß diese einem Bewußtseinsverlust gleichkommenden Ausnahmezustände einen sozial wertvollen Beitrag für die psychische Stabilität des Stammeslebens darstellen. In diesem Sinne hatten eigene Untersuchungen über den psychologisch-sozialen Aspekt des Schamanentums schon vor längerer Zeit³ zu folgender Definition geführt:

„Der Schamane ist ein Mensch, der dank seiner spezifischen Anlagen imstande ist, einen Ausnahmezustand (eine Ekstase) herbeizuführen, in Verbindung mit den transzendentalen Mächten Aussagen über Stammesangelegenheiten (Krankheiten, Jagd und Krieg) zu machen und auf seine ‚Gemeinde‘ eine religiös-therapeutische Wirksamkeit auszuüben, die an den jeweiligen kulturellen Rahmen seines Stammes gebunden ist und für diesen eine notwendige sozial-psychologische Funktion darstellt.“

Diese Definition kann auch heute noch als gültig angesehen werden, und es ist das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit, einen Beitrag über die

¹ A. Ohlmarks: Studien zum Problem des Schamanismus. Lund 1939, S. 365.

² K. Zucker: Psychologie des Schamanisierens. Zeitschr. f. d. gesamte Neurologie, Bd. 150. Berlin 1934, S. 707.

³ U. Greiling: Beitrag zur Psychologie des Schamanismus bei einigen Völkern des nördlichen Asiens und Amerikas. Inaugural-Dissertation, Friedrich-Wilhelm-Universität, Berlin 1944.